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The Duty to Think Strategically
Nadelle Grossman∗
ABSTRACT
Under Delaware corporate law, directors and officers have a
duty to oversee their firm’s management of risk to limit losses.
Corporate law does not, however, require directors or officers to
oversee their firm’s management of strategy to create gains. Yet,
managing both risk and strategy is essential to a firm in creating
value. In fact, as I argue in the Article, the current focus by courts
and commentators only on risk management to prevent losses
could actually undermine a firm’s management of its strategy for
gains. I therefore propose a model for how Delaware corporate law
can drive firms to manage their strategies for gains, in addition to
their risk of loss, all to create value.
This proposal is especially necessary in light of the fact that
companies such as General Motors collapsed not because of
excessive risk taking, but because they failed to sufficiently
formulate and implement innovative strategies for gains. This
proposal also opens an additional avenue to combat the significant
problem of short-termism, or the drive by firms to create shortterm profits regardless of whether that creates true value. It
combats short-termism by creating an expectation for officers and
directors to oversee their firm’s formulation and implementation of
value-creating strategic objectives. Those objectives, rather than
next quarter’s earnings targets, would then be expected to guide
firm decisions.
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I. INTRODUCTION

For decades, General Motors (GM) was a pillar of strength
among U.S. public companies. Not only was it among the three
largest public companies in the United States from 1955 until its
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bankruptcy in 2008,1 but for 77 years it was the largest automaker
in the world.2
Despite GM’s success, monsters lay beneath the surface. For
years, GM failed to produce smaller, safer, more fuel-efficient
vehicles in response to changing demand.3 As a result, it
increasingly lost market share to foreign competitors over the
course of three decades.4 GM also lagged behind its foreign
competitors in standardizing its manufacturing processes and the
platforms, body architectures, and components that it used to
manufacture its vehicles.5 Without such standardization, GM not
only faced substantially higher manufacturing costs, but it also
lacked the manufacturing flexibility to respond to changes in
demand.6
These failures left GM flat-footed when the financial crisis
struck in 2007–2008. Ultimately GM, together with Chrysler,
received roughly $80 billion in federal financial assistance at the
time of the crisis,7 and GM was forced to file for bankruptcy
protection to restructure its business in a way that would enable it
to compete in the future.8
While we may never know the true causes of GM’s collapse,
one factor in that collapse appears to be flaws in GM’s process for
managing its strategy. For example, numerous auto industry
experts have found that GM formulated its strategy for the creation
of gains on the basis of unrealistic assumptions about its
competitive environment.9 Even the Presidential Task Force on the
Auto Industry, formed to investigate the causes of GM’s and
1. See Fortune 500: A Database of 50 Years of Fortune’s List of America’s
Largest Corporations, CNN.COM, http://money.cnn.com/magazines /fortune
/fortune500archive/full/1998/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2012).
2. See BILL CANIS & BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE
U.S. MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY: CONFRONTING A NEW DYNAMIC IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 43 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc
/R41154.pdf.
3. See infra Part II.A.3.
4. See OBAMA ADMINISTRATION , DETERMINATION OF V IABILITY
S UMMARY : G ENERAL M OTORS C ORPORATION (2009) [hereinafter GM
V IABILITY S UMMARY], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets
/documents/GMViabilityAssessmentFINAL.pdf.
5. See infra Part II.A.3.
6. See infra Part II.A.3.
7. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JANUARY OVERSIGHT REPORT: AN
UPDATE ON TARP SUPPORT FOR THE DOMESTIC AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 18
(2011), available at http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop/20110402010325/
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-011311-report.pdf.
8. Neil King, Jr., & Sheila Terlep, GM Collapses into Government’s Arms,
WALL ST. J., June 2, 2009, at A1.
9. See infra Part II.A.1.
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Chrysler’s collapses, found that GM’s restructuring plan, which set
out GM’s strategy for future gains following its bankruptcy
restructuring, was created on the basis of unrealistic assumptions
about GM’s market share and pricing power.10
These unrealistic assumptions show flaws in GM’s process for
formulating its strategy. That is because strategic planners must
make realistic assumptions, on the basis of all available
information, about a firm’s competitive environment if their
strategy is going to effectively lay out a road-map for that firm’s
competitive survival.11 A strategy that fails to reflect realistic
assumptions about the future is not worth the paper on which it is
written.
On top of these planning deficiencies, GM historically failed to
implement the strategy that it had formulated.12 Thus, any benefits
that GM would have derived from having formulated a strategy
were lost.
These flaws in GM’s strategic management processes are not
aberrational. In fact, numerous business commentators have
identified the failure to maintain a current strategy and to
implement the selected strategy as common causes for firms’
collapses.13 Ultimately, these flaws undermine a firm’s ability to
generate value, for a firm can only hope to create sustained value
in a market economy if it has a realistic, forward-looking strategic
plan and if it effectively and efficiently implements that plan
through its employees’ decisions and tasks.14
Creating value also requires a firm to engage in the
complementary process of managing its risks.15 That is because
while a strategic plan sets out a plan for a firm to remain
competitive into the future, the future is uncertain and therefore
risky.16 Because of risk, a firm faces the prospect that it will not
generate the value that it expects from its strategic plan. Firms try
10. See infra Part II.A.1. The task force was comprised of members from
the Department of Treasury, National Economic Council, Council of Economic
Advisors, and the other Cabinet agencies involved in the President’s Task Force
on the Auto Industry, as well as individuals at industry-leading consulting,
financial advisory and law firms. GM VIABILITY SUMMARY, supra note 4, at 2.
This group also consulted with outside experts and affected stakeholders. Id.
11. See FRED R. DAVID, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: CONCEPTS AND CASES
79 (13th ed. 2011) (“Planning would be impossible without assumptions. . . .
Wild guesses should never be made in formulating strategies, but reasonable
assumptions based on available information must always be made.”).
12. See infra Part II.A.2.
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See infra Part II.A.
16. See infra Part II.A.
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to control for these decreases in expected value by managing their
risks.17 So, for example, a firm might purchase flood insurance to
transfer the risk of a flood destroying its income-producing
property to a third-party insurer. In this way, managing risk
increases a firm’s ability to generate gains from its strategy.
Despite the integral relationship between processes to manage
both value-creating strategic plans and risk, lawmakers have only
focused on fixing flaws in risk-management processes. This is
particularly true since the financial crisis struck, where faulty riskmanagement processes are thought to have paved the way for the
excessive risk taking that lay at the heart of the crisis.18 However,
those legal measures completely ignore the flaws that exist in the
related strategic-management processes, which also impair a firm’s
ability to create value. Most troubling, state corporate law imposes
no clear duty on officers or directors to oversee the management of
a firm’s strategy to create gains akin to the duty state corporate law
imposes on officers and directors to oversee a firm’s management
of risk.
Some might respond that corporate law does not need to
impose any duty on officers or directors to oversee the
management of strategy to create gains because officers already
have incentives––in the form of stock options and other kinds of
incentive compensation––to create gains and thus to implement
processes to achieve that end. However, incentive compensation
often motivates officers to generate gains over the short term rather
than true, sustained value.19 Yet, a firm ultimately benefits from
17. See infra Part II.A.
18. See, e.g., Press Release, Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission Releases Report on the Causes of the Financial Crisis (Jan.
27, 2011), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdnmedia/fcic-news
/2011-0127-fcic-releases-report.pdf (listing as one of the five identified causes
of the financial crisis “[d]ramatic breakdowns in corporate governance including
too many financial firms acting recklessly and taking on too much risk”);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J.
CORP. L. 967, 968 (2009) (“The financial crisis of 2008 revealed serious risk
management failures on an almost systemic basis throughout the business
community. Shareholder losses attributable to absent or poorly implemented risk
management programs likely are enormous.”); Robert T. Miller, Oversight
Liability for Risk-Management Failures at Financial Firms, 84 S. CAL. L. REV.
47, 50 (2010) (“Many people think that excessive risk taking by major financial
institutions was an important cause of the financial crisis of 2007–2008, and,
consequently, that there were significant failures of risk-management systems at
such firms.”).
19. Nadelle Grossman, Turning a Short-Term Fling into a Long-Term
Commitment: Board Duties in a New Era, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 905, 932
(2010) [hereinafter Grossman, Short-Term Fling]. The disconnect between
compensation and the creation of true value also explains why financial

454

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

value that is sustained.20 Thus, financial incentives do not
necessarily ensure that officers manage a firm’s strategic plan to
create gains.
To address the disconnect in corporate law between the
management of risk and the management of strategy, I propose that
the Delaware courts create an expectation on officers and directors
to oversee not only their firm’s risk-management system but also
its strategic-management system. In that way, fiduciary duties will
better guide officers and directors as to what it means to act in a
corporation’s best interest in an ongoing business context apart
from merely attempting to prevent losses through the management
of risk.
This Article is the first in the legal field to tackle in any depth
the management of value-creating processes apart from risk
management. For example, since GM’s strategic troubles initially
surfaced, numerous commentators have articulated proposals
designed to improve firms’ processes to manage risk.21 However,
none of those proposals addresses in any depth the need for firms
to create value through the related process of managing a firm’s
strategy for the creation of gains.22 My Article therefore fills a
significant gap in the legal literature and in the law in terms of
corporate processes to create value.

incentives do not adequately deter excessive risk taking, for losses from
excessive risk taking are generally only realized over time, after compensation
has been paid. See id. at 940.
20. Id. at 941.
21. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 985–90; Michelle M. Harner,
Ignoring the Writing on the Wall: The Role of Enterprise Risk Management in
the Economic Crisis, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 45, 57–58 (2010); Eric J. Pan,
Rethinking the Board’s Duty to Monitor: A Critical Assessment of the Delaware
Doctrine, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 209, 218 (2011) [hereinafter Pan, Rethinking
the Board’s Duty]; Betty Simkins & Steven A. Ramirez, Enterprise-Wide Risk
Management and Corporate Governance, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 571, 591–94
(2008); J. Robert Brown, Delaware Courts and Exonerating the Board from
Supervising Risk: In re Citigroup Derivative Litigation (Introduction),
THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Mar. 12, 2009, 9:00 AM), http://www.theraceto
thebottom.org/preemption-of-delaware-law/delaware-courts-and-exoneratingthe-board-from-supervising-r-4.html.
22. While Professor Bainbridge does mention the strategic-management
context for risk management, his proposal is focused solely on curbing excessive
risk taking without contemplating how that impacts the broader management of
strategy. Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 985–90. Professor Pan also describes the
board’s supervisory and advisory roles in the management of corporate strategy.
See Pan, Rethinking the Board’s Duty, supra note 21, at 218. However, his
proposal likewise focuses only on creating a more robust duty to monitor
business risk, without focusing on the other aspects of strategy. See id. at 241.

2013]

DUTY TO THINK STRATEGICALLY

455

My proposal also opens up an additional avenue for courts to
combat the significant problem of short-termism, or the drive by
firms to create short-term earnings regardless of whether that
creates true value.23 If officers and directors were expected to
manage their firm’s strategy, they would need to put in place
processes to ensure their firm has a long-term value-creating
strategic plan to fulfill that expectation. As such, that strategic
plan, rather than such short-term indicia as next quarter’s earnings
targets, would be expected to guide employee conduct.
This Article proceeds as follows: First, Part II explains the
different stages and considerations involved in strategic
management. It also highlights the relationship between strategic
management and risk management in creating corporate value.
Finally, that discussion explores the benefits of strategic
management, as well as some of the challenges associated with the
process.
Part III then discusses current corporate law requirements for
directors’ and officers’ management of strategy and risk. That
discussion focuses on state corporate law, as that law sets out
directors’ and officers’ duties to the firms that they serve.
However, Part III also considers those federal securities laws and
stock exchange governance rules that most directly impact
directors’ and officers’ strategic- and risk-management duties. As
that discussion shows, current law only obligates officers and
directors to create value through implementing risk-management
programs. It does not, however, impose any clear, coherent duty on
officers or directors to create value through the implementation of
a strategic-management system either as part of a standard of
liability or even as a normative standard of conduct.
Next, Part IV considers the consequences of the law’s failure to
address the management of strategy apart from risk. I then propose
some relatively modest shifts in corporate law with the goal of
bringing about more effective strategic-management practices for
the creation of value. Finally, Part V concludes.
II. STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
This section explores what strategic management is. Given the
absence of discussion of strategic management in legal literature,
the bulk of this discussion has been derived from business

23. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of the problem of short-termism and
how strategic management combats that problem.

456

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

commentary and other business sources.24 While that literature is
substantial, it is often also conflicting. Nevertheless, I have
attempted to cull a simplified picture of strategic management
from those sources to animate a discussion of how strategic
management impacts the corporate governance legal landscape.
Strategic management refers generally to the process of
managing a business in a way that maintains its competitiveness.25
Remaining competitive is critical to a firm, for that is the only way
that the firm can survive in a market economy and thus create
sustained value.
There are several different models firms can use to manage
their strategies.26 For purposes of this discussion, I will examine a
model that has three stages: First is the strategy formulation stage;
second is the strategy implementation stage; and third is the

24. Other legal commentators who have written on aspects of strategic
management have also cited to business authors as sources for strategicmanagement concepts. See, e.g., Constance E. Bagley, What’s Law Got to Do
With It?: Integrating Law and Strategy, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 587, 588 (2010)
(relying on the work of Michael Porter and his five-forces model); Norman W.
Hawker, What Do Business Schools Teach About Antitrust?: Antitrust Insights
from Strategic Management, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 67, 85 (2003) (concluding
that strategic management and related scholarship offer valuable insights into
why corporations act as they do and provide a useful lens through which to
understand how corporations react to legal concerns); Felix Oberholzer-Gee &
Dennis A. Yao, Antitrust—What Role for Strategic Management Expertise?, 90
B.U. L. REV. 1457, 1458, 1464–68 (2010) (relying on the work of Michael
Porter and other business academics to illustrate the link between antitrust law
and strategic management).
25. JAY B. BARNEY, GAINING AND SUSTAINING COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
6–7 (2d ed. 2002); DAVID, supra note 11, at 6; TONY MORDEN, AN
INTRODUCTION TO BUSINESS STRATEGY 2–3 (2d ed. 1999). See also Rajiv Nag
et al., What Is Strategic Management, Really? Inductive Derivation of a
Consensus Definition of the Field, 28 STRAT. MGMT. J. 935, 942–44 (2007)
(concluding, based on a survey of strategic-management scholars, that strategic
management is a field that deals with (a) the major intended and emergent
initiatives (b) taken by general managers on behalf of owners (c) involving
utilization of resources (d) to enhance the performance (e) of firms (f) in their
external environments). But see HENRY MINTZBERG ET AL., STRATEGY SAFARI:
A GUIDED TOUR THROUGH THE WILDS OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT passim
(1998) (explaining the ten different schools of thought as to strategic
management).
26. DAVID, supra note 11, at 14–15. See, e.g., ARTHUR A. THOMPSON, JR.,
ET AL., CRAFTING AND EXECUTING STRATEGY: THE QUEST FOR COMPETITIVE
ADVANTAGE 24 (17th ed. 2010) (describing the tasks of strategic management as
developing strategic vision and business mission; setting objectives and creating
strategy to achieve those objectives; implementing and executing strategy;
evaluating performance; and reviewing and implementing corrections).

2013]

DUTY TO THINK STRATEGICALLY

457

strategy evaluation and revision stage.27 Section A reviews each of
these stages.
The overall goal of managing a firm’s strategy is to create an
enterprise that is competitive and, as such, continues to generate
value. This and other virtues of strategic management are
discussed in Section B. Section B also discusses some drawbacks
to the strategic management process.
A. Stages of Strategic Management
This discussion explains the primary stages in the process of
strategic management. First, Subsection 1 discusses the strategyformulation stage. That discussion not only looks at the
formulation of a firm’s strategy, but it also examines the
formulation of a firm’s mission, which serves as the foundation for
its strategy, as well as the formulation of objectives, which serve as
the long-term goals that a firm’s strategy is designed to achieve.
Together, a firm’s mission, objectives, and strategy are referred to
as its strategic plan.28 Then Subsection 2 discusses the strategyimplementation stage. Subsection 3 next discusses the strategyevaluation and -revision stage. Finally, Subsection 4 explores the
board’s role with respect to this strategic-management process.
1. Strategy Formulation
Because firms exist to generate value,29 the goal of strategic
planners is to create a strategic plan for a firm to remain
27. These stages are generally consistent with the stages identified by a
number of business commentators. See, e.g., DAVID, supra note 11, at 15
(depicting graphically the stages of strategic management as the strategyformulation stage, the strategy-implementation stage, and the strategyevaluation stage); THOMPSON, JR., ET AL., supra note 26, at 24 (describing the
tasks of strategic management as developing strategic vision and business
mission; setting objectives and creating strategy to achieve those objectives;
implementing and executing strategy; evaluating performance; and reviewing
and implementing corrections).
28. THOMPSON, JR., ET AL., supra note 26, at 41.
29. See ROBERT R. MOELLER, COSO ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT:
UNDERSTANDING THE NEW INTEGRATED ERM FRAMEWORK 48 (2007); Antony
Page, Has Corporate Law Failed? Addressing Proposals for Reform, 107 MICH.
L. REV. 979, 986 (2009) (“Whether one supports the concession-theory or
contract view of a corporation, the ultimate ends of a corporation should
invariably be the pursuit of aggregate social welfare and the interests of society
as a whole.”). Some commentators describe the purpose of the firm as the
maximization of value, or wealth. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L.
Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and the
Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 146 (2008) (“Both sides [referring to
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competitive into the future. Only if a firm survives into the future
can it hope to generate value beyond current orders and
prospects.30
The foundation of that plan is known as its mission.31 More
specifically, a firm’s mission explains why the firm exists.32 In
addition to revealing a firm’s core values, a firm’s mission often
serves a motivational purpose.33 By telling employees what the
ultimate goal of their efforts is, they can see how their tasks fit into
the firm’s grand scheme. However, a mission is not designed to
provide discrete operational goals.34 Objectives, rather, serve that
purpose.35
A firm’s objectives are the qualitative and quantitative goals
toward which all resources and efforts are to be devoted, usually
over the next five years or so.36 While some objectives are
financial, others are more market based (for example, objectives
tied to a firm’s market share).37 A firm may also have operational
objectives, compliance objectives, or reporting objectives.38 While
some of these objectives are primarily within a firm’s control (e.g.,
compliance and reporting objectives), others depend to a greater

shareholder primacists and director primacists] claim wealth maximization for
the firm as the purpose in view.”).
30. For this reason, a firm’s true value is usually determined by the
discounted value of its estimated future cash flows. RICHARD A. BREALEY &
STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 27–28 (1996).
31. DAVID, supra note 11, at 44.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 47–50.
34. GARTH SALONER ET AL., STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 24 (2001).
35. MOELLER, supra note 29, at 62.
36. MORDEN, supra note 25, at 112–13. See also PAUL FIFIELD, MARKETING
STRATEGY: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MARKETING AND MARKETS 18 (3d ed.
2007) (“Managers generally believe that their (and any) market becomes
unpredictable beyond five years, so it is pointless (academic) looking out any
further.”). Still, depending on a firm’s industry, product life-cycle, and other
factors, a firm might plan for either a shorter or longer period. For example,
Brown-Forman Corp., manufacturer of spirits such as Jack Daniels whiskey, has
a ten-year strategic plan. Brown-Forman Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at
20 (June 27, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data
/14693/000119312512285018/0001193125-12-285018-index.htm.
37. See THOMPSON, JR., ET AL., supra note 26, at 33–34.
38. See THE COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE
TREADWAY COMMISSION (COSO), ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT—
INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 20–21, 36–39 (2004) [hereinafter COSO ERM
FRAMEWORK], available at http://www.drcia.org/old/UploadFiles/UploadFiles
1882/200804/20080415101610532.pdf; GREGORY MONAHAN, ENTERPRISE RISK
MANAGEMENT: A METHODOLOGY FOR ACHIEVING STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 13–
21 (2008).
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extent on factors beyond the firm’s control (e.g., financial and
market objectives).39
Setting objectives that are clearly articulated and challenging
but achievable is essential to a firm; it causes those who manage a
firm to have a clear and widely understood set of goals as to where
the firm will be over the time period covered by those objectives.40
That, in turn, guards against a firm’s simply drifting along without
any clear direction to guide its decisions.41 That is especially risky
in a competitive environment, where a period of complacency or
drift could place that firm behind its competitors.42 Moreover, a
firm can track its progress against its objectives.43 Thus, objectives
give firms outcomes against which the firms can measure and
evaluate their performance. Employee compensation can also be
tied to the achievement of those objectives.44
Objectives do not, however, tell a firm’s employees how to
achieve those goals.45 Rather, a strategy serves that purpose.
Specifically, a strategy details how, functionally, a firm plans to
achieve its objectives.46 A strategy lays out the concrete procedures
and assignable responsibilities for achieving a firm’s objectives.47
So, for example, a strategy guides decisions such as which
products to develop or manufacture and which market segments to
pursue in an attempt to achieve the firm’s objectives.48
The key to creating an effective strategic plan is ensuring that it
reflects the firm’s competitive approach. In other words, the plan
must reflect that firm’s competitive advantage, i.e., the quality that
makes that firm unique compared to its competitors, leading to its
hoped-for survival.49 There are a number of frameworks through
39. See COSO ERM FRAMEWORK, supra note 38, at 21 (distinguishing
objectives relating to the reliability of reporting and compliance with law, which
are within the entity’s control, from achievement of objectives, such as attaining
a specific market share or successfully launching a new product line, which are
not entirely within the entity’s control).
40. THOMPSON, JR., ET AL., supra note 26, at 33.
41. See id. (noting that goals push organizations to be intentional and
focused in their actions).
42. See id.; see also infra Part II.A.3.
43. See MORDEN, supra note 25, at 112–13; SALONER ET AL., supra note 34,
at 10–12.
44. See DAVID, supra note 11, at 232.
45. THOMPSON, JR., ET AL., supra note 26, at 6, 37 (noting that strategy
making is all about the “how” and that it follows the setting of objectives).
46. DAVID, supra note 11, at 133–34.
47. See FIFIELD, supra note 36, at 94–96; MORDEN, supra note 25, at 113–14.
48. See THOMPSON, JR., ET AL., supra note 26, at 37.
49. DAVID, supra note 11, at 9; MORDEN, supra note 25, at 49 (“[If a
corporation] has no source of competitive advantage it will not survive. . . .
Adding value, and developing or sustaining competitive advantage are both
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which a firm can critically analyze the source of its competitive
advantage. For example, under one framework, developed by
leading strategic-management scholar Michael Porter, a firm’s
competitive advantage stems from its position within its industry.50
So, for instance, a company must be able to supply the same
products to customers as its industry peers but at a lower cost––
translated into a lower price––to compete.51 Or it must be able to
supply its customers with a unique product that its competitors do
not provide, or focus on a specific target-market, to remain
competitive.52 Under another framework advanced by Gary Hamel
and C.K. Prahalad, a firm’s competitive advantage is based
primarily on the firm’s unique competencies.53 For example, a
firm’s competitive advantage might stem from its unique technical
know-how or a uniquely reliable process.54
In addition to identifying its competitive advantage, planners
must also identify and analyze a firm’s source or sources of
weakness, or what the company does poorly compared to its
competitors.55 If any such weakness makes a firm competitively
susceptible, that firm might need to correct for that weakness to be
able to compete.56
However, a firm is limited in what it can achieve by leveraging
its competitive advantage, even despite its weaknesses. These
limits are sometimes referred to as constraints.57 Internally, a firm
is constrained by its resources, competencies, skills and operational

critical to enterprise survival in competitive markets.”); SALONER ET AL., supra
note 34, at 40. But see MANUEL BECERRA, THEORY OF THE FIRM FOR STRATEGIC
MANAGEMENT: ECONOMIC VALUE ANALYSIS 130–31 (2009) (stating that
empirical evidence shows that competition does erode profits, but only over the
long term).
50. MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR
ANALYZING INDUSTRIES AND COMPETITORS 30 (1980).
51. MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING AND
SUSTAINING SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE 3 (1985). This type of competitive
advantage is referred to as cost leadership. See id. at 12. It may not be
sustainable over time, however, as peer firms learn how to produce products at
lower cost. Thus, it requires continuous effort to keep cutting costs to prevent
imitation. See id. at 13–14, 112.
52. Id. at 14–15. Supplying unique products is referred to as differentiation.
Id. at 14, 119. Differentiation causes customers to be less price-sensitive by
creating brand loyalty. Id. at 120.
53. See GARY HAMEL & C.K. PRAHALAD, COMPETING FOR THE FUTURE 31–
32 (1994).
54. FIFIELD, supra note 36, at 105.
55. THOMPSON, JR., ET AL., supra note 26, at 111.
56. See id. at 115.
57. See, e.g., MORDEN, supra note 25, at 5.
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capabilities.58 Some business commentators view shareholder
demands for returns as an internal constraint on the basis that
shareholders do not set a firm’s ultimate business objectives, but
rather have a quasi-contractual interest that must be served as a
condition to their continued financial support for the firm.59
External constraints, such as customer demand, social and
environmental forces, competitive environment, and contractual
commitments to external market actors, also limit what a firm can
achieve with its competitive advantage.60 Moreover, the law limits
what a business can––and cannot––do with its competitive
advantage and resources.61 An effective strategic plan must not
only lay out a path for competitiveness in light of that firm’s
uniqueness, but must also reflect these constraints, which limit
what the firm can achieve.
Still, a firm cannot be assured of success even after factoring in
its constraints because the future in which the firm operates is
unknown and therefore uncertain.62 Strategic-management
processes seek to anticipate and respond to this uncertainty, which
might either involve a potential future threat (i.e., risk) or potential
future opportunity.
Broadly speaking, risk is the potential for an outcome to
deviate from what is expected.63 In the context of business, risk
can cause a firm to generate a much lower level of returns than
expected or can even cause a firm to generate a loss. For example,
by holding over $43 billion worth of mortgage-related assets,64
Citigroup was exposed to significant credit risk if the
creditworthiness of the borrowers on the debt contracts underlying
those mortgages deteriorated. When the housing market collapsed
and borrowers on such debt contracts defaulted en masse,
Citigroup suffered major losses. In fact, more than half of
58. See DAVID, supra note 11, at 93–95; MORDEN, supra note 25, at 35.
59. See, e.g., MORDEN, supra note 25, at 178–79.
60. See DAVID, supra note 11, at 61–74.
61. See id. at 68–69. But see Bagley, supra note 24, at 639 (“Law is more
than a force that constrains managers and their firms. Properly harnessed by a
legally astute management team, law can be a source of sustained competitive
advantage.”).
62. See NEIL A. DOHERTY, CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT: A FINANCIAL
EXPOSITION 8–10 (1985).
63. See MICHEL CROUHY ET AL., THE ESSENTIALS OF RISK MANAGEMENT
4–5 (2006). Risk is essentially quantifiable uncertainty. Daniel A. Farber,
Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 901 (2011).
64. Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, Citigroup Saw No Red Flags Even As It
Made Bolder Bets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2008, at A1, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/business/23citi.html.
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Citigroup’s $65 billion losses are thought to stem from its
mortgage-related assets.65
Risk, at least in theory, captures future events and
circumstances that might yield greater returns than expected in
addition to those that might yield lesser returns.66 Despite that,
commentators and policymakers typically use the term risk only in
its down-side sense, referring to risks that might cause results to be
lower than expected.67 For that reason, I use the term risk in this
Article exclusively in its down-side sense and use the term
opportunity to refer to up-side risk.
Still, even risk is not necessarily bad. In fact, our economy is
built on the notion that businesses will take risks that might lead to
great gains––but that might also lead to losses.68 However, firms
“manage” their risks in an attempt to limit unexpected downward
swings in returns.
Managing risk at the strategic-planning phase involves first
identifying the possible risks that might surface that could cause

65. Id.
66. See Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 21, at 577 (tracing the etymology of
the word risk to two Chinese symbols that mean danger and opportunity).
67. See, e.g., CROUHY ET AL., supra note 63, at 4–8 (giving examples of risk
that only involve loss or the potential for loss); MORDEN, supra note 25, at 211
(explaining risk in terms of actual or potential loss); Michelle M. Harner,
Barriers to Effective Risk Management, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1323, 1328–29
& n.17 (2010) (adopting the dictionary definition of risk, which is “the
possibility of loss or injury,” though expanding on that definition to include the
consequences of that loss). The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission (COSO), a private organization sponsored by a number
of professional accounting organizations that influences frameworks for the
implementation of accounting standards, has drawn a similar distinction between
risks and opportunities. See COSO ERM FRAMEWORK, supra note 38, at 16
(defining risk as “the possibility that an event will occur and adversely affect the
achievement of objectives” and opportunity as “the possibility that an event will
occur and positively affect the achievement of objectives”). Nevertheless, the
COSO ERM Framework, discussed infra in this Part II.A.1, contemplates
processes to manage opportunities as well as risks.
68. See ASWATH DAMODARAN, STRATEGIC RISK TAKING: A FRAMEWORK
FOR RISK MANAGEMENT 8–9 (2008) (stating that “increasing exposures to some
risk is an integral part of success” and that successful companies take calculated
risks); Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction
to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 641 (2003) (explaining that investors
like returns but dislike risk and that “there is an inverse relationship between the
two”); E. Norman Veasey, The Challenges for Directors in Piloting Through
State and Federal Standards in the Maelstrom of Risk Management, 34 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2010) (“Because the taking of prudent risks is inherently the
engine of corporate profit maximization, a risk-taking strategy is important.”).
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the firm to generate lower returns than expected.69 Next, planners
measure those risks by considering the probability of each of those
outcomes.70 Finally, planners consider whether and how to respond
to each risk should it occur, such as by eliminating the risk or
mitigating the down-side effect of the risk.71 One way to eliminate
risk, for example, is to refrain from the risky conduct.72 Ways of
mitigating the down-side effects of risk include sharing or
transferring the risk to a third party through hedging or insurance73
and preventative and responsive internal control measures.74 Of
course, planners may also decide that it does not pay to reduce or
eliminate risk and engage in the risky conduct nonetheless.75
Ultimately, risk management at the strategy-formulation stage
helps planners both set objectives as well as select the strategy that
they expect will achieve those objectives. It helps planners select
strategy because they can select the strategy that they believe is
likely to generate the highest level of “risk-adjusted” returns within
the firm’s desired risk appetite and tolerance level.76 That level of
risk-adjusted returns, then, can become one of the firm’s financial
objectives. Thus, managing risk is critical to a firm’s management
of its strategy, even though selecting a strategic plan calls for more
than identifying, measuring, and planning a response to risk.
Firms vary in the approach they take to managing risk, which
impacts the setting of strategic plans and other stages of strategic
management. Some firms take what is referred to as the silo
approach, where they approach different kinds of risk in separate
69. See JAMES LAM, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT: FROM INCENTIVES TO
CONTROLS 27 (2003); MOELLER, supra note 29, at 22–23 (listing “risk
identification” as the first step in risk management).
70. See MOELLER, supra note 29, at 22 (listing the “quantitative and
qualitative assessment” of risk as the second step in risk management).
71. See id. (listing “risk prioritization and response planning” as the third
step in risk management); Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 970.
72. Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 970.
73. Suleyman Basak et al., Risk Management with Benchmarking, 52
MGMT. SCI. 542, 542 (2006). However, it may be very costly to fully insure the
downside effect of this kind of risk. Id.
74. See CROUHY ET AL., supra note 63, at 48–49.
75. See Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 970. In fact, firms are generally
willing to accept risks that are core to their business because they are seen as
having a competitive advantage in accepting that kind of risk. CORPORATE RISK
MANAGEMENT (Donald H. Chew ed., 2008).
76. See CROUHY ET AL., supra note 63, at 367–73. Risk appetite refers to the
amount of risk an institution is willing to take on in the pursuit of value. COSO
ERM FRAMEWORK, supra note 38, at 19; MOELLER, supra note 29, at 51. Risk
tolerance refers to the tolerable range of variance from expected values. COSO
ERM FRAMEWORK, supra note 38, at 20; MOELLER, supra note 29, at 66.
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and non-integrated silos apart from other kinds of risk.77 Moreover,
different organizational units within a firm might approach risk
separately from other units.78 For example, a firm’s credit group
might manage credit risk, and its IT group might manage the risk
from a disruption in the continuity of IT systems (such as IT credit
systems), but there may not be any communication or coordination
between these groups.79
One of the biggest concerns with the silo approach at the
strategy-formulation stage is that no one at the firm is deciding on
an appropriate enterprise-wide risk appetite or risk tolerance when
formulating a firm’s strategy.80 The silo approach also could lead
to the failure to appreciate cross effects of risk between
organizational units as well as kinds of risk.81 For these reasons,
the silo approach is thought to lead to the management of risk in an
ad hoc, informal, and uncoordinated way.82
These concerns were the primary driving force behind the
alternate approach to risk management referred to as enterprise risk
management, or ERM.83 According to the Committee of
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO),
a private organization sponsored by a number of professional
accounting organizations that has promulgated the leading ERM
framework,84 ERM is an integrated, holistic, process-oriented
approach to managing risks, including at the strategy-setting stage,
with the intent of maximizing value for the enterprise.85
77. See Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 21, at 581.
78. See MOELLER, supra note 29, at 49.
79. See id.
80. See Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 21, at 575–76.
81. MOELLER, supra note 29, at 33–34 (noting that there might be risk
interdependencies between business units that a silo approach to risk
management might miss, such as in the case of Arthur Andersen, where offices
did not consider risks generated by other offices).
82. MARK L. FRIGO & RICHARD J. ANDERSON, COSO, EMBRACING
ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT: PRACTICAL APPROACHES FOR GETTING
STARTED 10 (2011), available at http://www.coso.org/documents/Embracing
ERM-GettingStartedforWebPostingDec110.pdf.
83. See JAMES W. DELOACH, ENTERPRISE-WIDE RISK MANAGEMENT:
STRATEGIES FOR LINKING RISK AND OPPORTUNITY xii (2000).
84. MOELLER, supra note 29, at 3.
85. DELOACH, supra note 83, at xiii; MOELLER, supra note 29, at 3. ERM is
integrated and holistic in that it is designed to break down the functional and
cultural barriers that exist between different business and operating units such
that risk is seen and addressed through a single, integrated framework. See
DELOACH, supra note 83, at xiii; FRIGO & ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 1;
Stephen Gates, Incorporating Strategic Risk into Enterprise Risk Management:
A Survey of Current Corporate Practice, 18 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., no. 4, 2006
at 81, 83, 85. Thus, the focus is not on managing specific kinds of risks (such as
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While many commentators point to ERM as the future of risk
management,86 the ERM movement is still nascent.87 In fact,
according to a study conducted on behalf of COSO, 60% of the
respondents indicated that their firms’ processes for tracking risks
were informal and ad hoc, or tracked within individual business
silos rather than on an enterprise-wide basis.88
Even if the ERM movement gains traction, its focus is on the
creation of value through better risk-management processes.
However, it does not focus on processes to create value apart from
managing risk, such as through the management of strategy.89 Yet,
because ERM’s primary purpose is to help a firm create value,90
the process is integrally related with strategic-management
processes.91

credit, market, or operational risk), or risk within specific business units or
operating units (such as the marketing or finance business units or South
American operations), but on managing risk on an enterprise-wide basis so that
it conforms to the company’s desired risk appetite and tolerance level. Because
of the enterprise-wide lens through which risk is viewed under ERM, it is
performed in a top-down process. See FRIGO & ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 1;
Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 21, at 581. That means that officers who have
an enterprise-wide perspective and sightline supervise a firm’s management of
risk, though they do so in consultation with lower level managers. See
MOELLER, supra note 29, at 24–29; FRIGO & ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 1.
86. See, e.g., Richard B. Corbett, A View of the Future of Risk Management,
6 RISK MGMT. 51, 56 (2004); James W. DeLoach & David M. Johnson, Beyond
Sarbanes-Oxley, 143 PUB. UTIL. FORT., no 10, 2005, at 60, 60–61.
87. See MONAHAN, supra note 38, at 119 (explaining how the low rate of
adoption of COSO’s ERM framework may be, in part, due to its lack of
guidance in how to design or implement an ERM system).
88. MARK S. BEASLEY ET AL., COSO, COSO’S 2010 REPORT ON ERM:
CURRENT STATE OF ENTERPRISE RISK OVERSIGHT AND MARKET PERCEPTIONS OF
COSO’S ERM FRAMEWORK iii (2010), available at http://www.coso.org
/documents/COSOSurveyReportFULL-Web-R6FINALforWEBPOSTING1117
10.pdf (finding from a study that only 28% of survey respondents reported
implementing ERM systems that were “systematic, robust and repeatable” and
60% reported “risk tracking [that] is mostly informal and ad hoc”).
89. See COSO ERM FRAMEWORK, supra note 38, at 14 (noting that
management’s choice as to objectives and the allocation of resources,
presumably to implement strategy, are not part of ERM).
90. See id. at 5–6 (“Enterprise risk management ensures that management
has in place a process to set objectives and that the chosen objectives support
and align with the entity’s mission and are consistent with its risk appetite.”).
91. See Enterprise Risk Management: Current Initiatives and Issues: Journal
of Applied Finance Roundtable, 18 J. APPLIED FIN., no. 1, 2008 at 115
(interviewing Todd Perkins, the Chief Risk Officer of Southern Company, one of
the largest utilities in the Southeastern U.S., who explained that Southern
Company’s ERM group is “tightly integrated” into its strategic planning group);
Protiviti Inc., Guide to Enterprise Risk Management: Frequently Asked Questions
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The momentum behind ERM is confined to the riskmanagement field. In other words, there is no similar
comprehensive framework that firms are encouraged to adopt in
strategy selection. However, there does seem to be some consensus
that firms should take a bottom-up approach to the formulation of
strategic plans for value creation.92 Thus, lower level managers and
employees formulate objectives and strategy, at least at the
divisional and operational levels, and actively participate in the
setting of overall corporate objectives and strategy by the firm’s
officers.93 This sort of participation by employees and lower level
managers in setting strategy not only allows those managers and
employees to better understand what the firm is doing and why, but
it also enhances their commitment to helping the firm achieve its
objectives.94 Nevertheless, strategic-management scholars stress
the need for firms to take a balanced approach to the formulation
of strategic plans and adopt one that is deemed best for that
particular firm.95
For an example of what happens when strategic-planning
efforts go awry, consider the case of GM. While Roger Smith
emphasized the need for strategic planning during his tenure as
GM’s CEO throughout the 1980s,96 according to Maryann Keller,
a financial analyst for the automobile industry who has extensively
studied GM, GM’s process did not allow for the introduction of
new ideas, which were perceived as a challenge to the existing way
of doing things.97 That mentality would have undermined GM’s
strategic-planning efforts, for it is hard to imagine creating

11 (2006), available at http://www.knowledgeleader.com/KnowledgeLeader/
Content.nsf/Web+Content/WhitePapersArticlesGuidetoEnterpriseRiskManageme
ntFrequentlyAskedQuestions!OpenDocument (follow “Download” hyperlink)
(“The key [to ERM] is to keep the effort simple and focused by integrating ERMrelated activities into the business strategy and plan.”).
92. DAVID, supra note 11, at 302 (“[C]urrent research supports the bottomup approach [to the process of formulating strategy], at least among U.S.
firms.”).
93. Id. at 138, 302. Cf Cynthia A. Montgomery, Putting Leadership Back
into Strategy, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 2008, at 6 (arguing that needing to create
and recreate reasons for a company’s continued existence set the strategist apart
from every other individual in the company and that guiding this never-ending
process is the crowning responsibility of the CEO).
94. See DAVID, supra note 11, at 175.
95. Id. at 302.
96. MARYANN KELLER, RUDE AWAKENING: THE RISE, FALL, AND STRUGGLE
FOR RECOVERY OF GENERAL MOTORS 108–09 (1990).
97. See id. at 19–21.
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innovative plans for the creation of gains where creative thought is
stymied.
Moreover, Keller found that GM’s strategic-planning process
relied upon numerous unrealistic assumptions. For example, for
years GM assumed that foreign competitors were simply temporary
opportunists who got lucky in the oil crisis, rather than long-term
competitors who built better cars.98 It also assumed that customers
would be loyal to GM regardless of the quality of its products or
changing competitive environment.99 Such assumptions would have
undermined GM’s strategic-planning process because that process
depends on the making of reasonable assumptions based on
available information.100 Without such reasonable assumptions, the
planning process simply cannot proceed effectively.101
The Obama Administration’s auto task force, formed to
investigate the causes of GM’s and Chrysler’s collapses,102 also
found that GM made unrealistic assumptions in its planning
efforts. For example, it found that GM’s assumption as to its
projected future market share was too optimistic in light of the fact
that it had been losing market share to competitors for decades.103
The auto task force also found that GM’s assumption about
product price increases was too optimistic in light of a severely
distressed market, lingering quality perceptions and an increase in
smaller vehicles, where GM has historically made lower profit
margins.104 Once again, these unrealistic assumptions reveal flaws

98. Id. at 22–23, 25–26. See also JAMES E. HARBOUR, FACTORY MAN 136–
37 (2009); PAUL INGRASSIA & JOSEPH B. WHITE, COMEBACK: THE FALL AND
RISE OF THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 139 (1994) (noting that the
Detroit automakers denied that they were uncompetitive in product quality,
productivity, and cost in the early 1980s).
99. KELLER, supra note 96, at 21–26.
100. DAVID, supra note 11, at 79.
101. Id.
102. The task force was comprised of members from the Department of
Treasury, the National Economic Council, the Council of Economic Advisors,
and the other Cabinet agencies involved in the President’s Task Force on the
Auto Industry, as well as individuals at industry-leading consulting, financial
advisory and law firms. GM VIABILITY SUMMARY, supra note 4, at 2. This
group also consulted with outside experts and affected stakeholders. Id.
103. Id. at 3.
104. Id. Professor Sydney Finkelstein at the Tuck School at Dartmouth
College has also argued that GM managed its strategy on the basis of false
assumptions. See Sydney Finkelstein, When Bad Things Happen to Good
Companies: Strategy Failure and Flawed Executives, 26 J. BUS. STRATEGY 19,
25 (2005) (arguing that GM predicated its automation strategy on a false
assumption––that GM was unable to compete with foreign competitors because
of its labor force rather than its failure to adopt a lean manufacturing system––
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in GM’s planning process and help explain why GM’s strategic
plan failed to set out a realistic plan for its competitive survival.105
The Obama auto task force also found that GM’s restructuring
plan failed to show how the company would remain competitively
viable.106 This deficiency also demonstrates that GM’s strategicplanning process was flawed, for surely an effective process for
formulating a strategy––whether or not in the face of a
restructuring––should ensure that the plan on its face appears to
achieve the purpose for which it was designed: to create a plan for a
firm’s competitive survival.107
2. Strategy Implementation
Once a firm’s strategic plan has been formulated, the strategy
included within that plan must then be implemented by everyone
within the enterprise to assure that the business choices made in
the strategy are carried out through day-to-day decisions and
tasks.108 Effective implementation means that resources within a
firm are efficiently deployed, and tasks carried out, to implement
that plan.109 Successful strategy implementation also requires
developing a strategy-supportive culture and organizational
structure.110
Managers at all levels often take the lead in the implementation
of strategy, for it is the employees whom they oversee who carry
out the day-to-day implementing decisions and tasks.111 For that
reason, it is often essential that a firm’s strategic plan be clearly
communicated to the employees tasked with carrying it out.112 Not

and that this false assumption stemmed from its failure to understand how
people and machines could be effectively integrated).
105. GM VIABILITY SUMMARY, supra note 4, at 3−4.
106. Id. at 4−5.
107. Other business commentators have also hinted at strategic-management
missteps as at least part of the reason for GM’s collapse. For example, according
to David Aaker, Professor Emeritus at the Haas School of Business, GM was
preoccupied with short-term profits and, as a result, lacked strategic vision.
David A. Aaker, GM’s Biggest Strategic Blunder, MARKETING PROFS (Mar. 10,
2009), http://www.marketingprofs.com/articles/2009/2866/gms-biggest-strategic
-blunder.
108. See DAVID, supra note 11, at 212–13.
109. See id. at 213; THOMPSON, JR., ET AL., supra note 26, at 42 (listing out
the principal steps in the process of strategy execution).
110. See THOMPSON, JR., ET AL., supra note 26, at 42.
111. DAVID, supra note 11, at 215.
112. ROBERT S. KAPLAN & DAVID P. NORTON, THE EXECUTION PREMIUM:
LINKING STRATEGY TO OPERATIONS FOR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 3–6 (2008)
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only does this ensure that those employees understand where the
firm is going so that they can help it get there, but it also helps
them identify, and, in turn, communicate to top managers, where
the firm skips its strategic track.113
Many firms use what is known as the Balanced Scorecard
(BSC) as a framework to guide their implementation of strategy.114
The BSC is a strategic-planning and -management system designed
to translate a firm’s strategic plan into specific business
activities.115 It also gives firms a framework to evaluate how well
their implementation efforts achieve the firm’s financial and nonfinancial objectives.116
Similar to ERM’s approach to risk management, the BSC takes
a holistic approach to strategy by looking at strategy from the four
perspectives from which an enterprise creates value: the financial,
customer, internal business process, and learning and growth
perspectives.117 Also similar to ERM, the BSC promotes an
integrated approach to strategy implementation. It does that by
providing a shared framework that allows all participants to see
how their individual activities contribute to achieving the firm’s
goals.118 Thus, like ERM, the BSC prevents silos from cutting off

[hereinafter KAPLAN & NORTON, EXECUTION PREMIUM] (finding that 73% of
companies that achieved outstanding performance clearly communicated their
strategies and strategic measures to their employees, whereas only 28% of
companies that underperformed took such action); EDWARD E. LAWLER, III, THE
ULTIMATE ADVANTAGE: CREATING THE HIGH-INVOLVEMENT ORGANIZATION
205–06 (1992).
113. LAWLER, supra note 112, at 205–06. Accord Michael Beer & Russell A.
Eisenstat, The Silent Killers of Strategy Implementation and Learning, 41
SLOAN MGMT. REV., no. 4, 2000 at 29, 33 (finding that blocked vertical
communication about strategy impaired employees’ abilities to decide on a dayto-day basis which of their activities would be most helpful in making the
business successful and undermined upward communication to warn the higher
levels when the engine is “skipping the track”).
114. See Bernard Marr & Gianni Schiuma, Business Performance—Past,
Present and Future, 41 MGMT. DECISION 680, 680 (2003) (finding that the BSC
is widely used).
115. What Is the Balanced Scorecard?, BALANCED SCORECARD INST.,
http://www.balancedscorecard.org/BSCResources/AbouttheBalancedScorecard/t
abid/55/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 21, 2012).
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. See Robert S. Kaplan & David P. Norton, Strategic Learning and the
Balanced Scorecard, 24 STRATEGY & LEADERSHIP, no. 5, 1996 at 18, 20.
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communication and coordination among business and operating
units in the implementation of strategy.119
Despite its apparent merits, results are mixed as to whether the
BSC improves results.120 Perhaps that explains why so many
commentators have cited strategy implementation as firms’
primary challenge. For example, according to Larry Bossidy,
former Chief Operating Officer of General Electric and CEO of
Honeywell, and Ram Charan, well-known author and business
advisor, the absence of strategy execution is the biggest obstacle to
a firm’s success.121 Professors Kaplan and Norton, founders of the
BSC, also recently concluded that most firms still struggle with
implementing their strategies.122 As a result, firms only realize a
fraction of the financial performance from their strategic plans.123
Thus, neither the BSC nor any other strategy implementation
framework has the kind of momentum behind it that ERM efforts
currently have in the context of risk management.
GM once again exemplifies a company whose progress was
likely impaired by its failure to implement its strategy. In fact,
according to Keller, despite GM’s focus in the early 1980s on
strategic planning, GM’s strategies ended up on executives’
shelves gathering dust rather than in action.124 Thus, the virtues
behind its having a strategy for the creation of gains were lost.
3. Strategy Evaluation and Revision
Once a firm has implemented a strategy for a period of time, it
can assess whether or not that plan is indeed leading it on a path
toward achieving its objectives and thus creating value for the firm
119. See Beer & Eisenstat, supra note 113, at 29, 32 (finding that one of the
killers of strategy implementation is the operation by top managers in their own
silos, refusing to cooperate effectively for fear of losing power).
120. See, e.g., Kathy Williams, What Constitutes a Successful Balanced
Scorecard?, 86 STRATEGIC FIN., no. 5, 2004 at 19 (finding that fewer than 20%
of the companies with BSC projects have realized overall performance
improvement).
121. LARRY BOSSIDY & RAM CHARAN, EXECUTION: THE DISCIPLINE OF
GETTING THINGS DONE 5 (2002).
122. KAPLAN & NORTON, EXECUTION PREMIUM, supra note 112, at 3
(“Various surveys over the past two decades indicate that 60 to 80 percent of
companies fall far short of targets expressed in their strategic plans.”). See also
DAVID, supra note 11, at 7 (noting that strategy implementation is often
considered to be the most difficult stage in strategic management).
123. KAPLAN & NORTON, EXECUTION PREMIUM, supra note 112, at 5, 22–32
(reporting from the results of a survey that “[h]aving a formal strategy execution
system made success two to three times as likely as did not having such a
system”).
124. See KELLER, supra note 96, at 109.
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and its constituents. If it turns out that a strategy is not effectively
driving toward firm objectives, that strategy (or those objectives)
must be revised so that the strategy furthers the objectives.
One of the primary challenges in evaluating the success of a
strategy is the lack of information with which a firm can measure
achievement of nonfinancial objectives. In fact, the authors of one
study found that despite numerous financial firms having identified
nonfinancial factors as key drivers of their creation of value, those
firms generally used low-quality performance measures to track
the success of those factors.125 Because those drivers of firm value
are reflected in a firm’s objectives,126 firms often do not have
adequate measures in place to determine whether they have
achieved their nonfinancial objectives through implementing their
strategies.
Moreover, new risks and opportunities continually arise, and
the probabilities of previously identified risks and opportunities
change. In addition, a firm may develop a different strength, its
competitive landscape may change, and other determinants of a
firm’s strategy might change. Firms must ensure that these changes
are not only identified but also communicated by employees to the
appropriate people so that those people can decide whether or not
an alteration in the firm’s strategy or objectives, or both, is in
order.127 They can also decide whether a change in the allocation
of resources is needed.
Ideally, a firm communicates these changed circumstances to
the planners who are responsible for formulating its strategic
plan.128 Those planners can then decide whether or not a shift in
strategy or objectives is warranted. The key, then, is to have
adequate controls in place to catch such changes and to
communicate them to those planners.
While ERM controls are intended to serve this purpose as to
new risks, and at least in the case of COSO’s ERM framework,
new opportunities,129 the absence of systematic, robust, and
125. Christopher D. Ittner et al., Performance Implications of Strategic
Performance Measurements in Financial Services Firms, 28 ACCT., ORG. &
SOC’Y 715, 725 (2003).
126. See id. at 727 (examining measurement standards across all uses,
including setting goals, in conducting their study).
127. See COSO ERM FRAMEWORK, supra note 38, at 16 (“Management
channels opportunities back to its strategy or objective setting processes, so that
actions can be formalized to seize the opportunities.”); THOMPSON, JR., ET AL.,
supra note 26, at 11, 43 (noting that a company’s objectives and strategy have to
be revised any time external or internal conditions warrant it).
128. See COSO ERM FRAMEWORK, supra note 38, at 85–86.
129. See id. at 61–62.
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repeatable ERM systems suggests that companies do not have in
place the controls they need to communicate such changes to the
appropriate planners. In fact, in the COSO study mentioned above,
organizational leaders at almost half of the responding
organizations had either no, or only minimal, processes in place for
identifying and monitoring emerging strategic risks.130 Moreover,
an ERM system does not necessarily lay out a process through
which a firm’s strategic plan is to be revised in light of such risks
and opportunities––that process occurs as part of the strategicmanagement process.
If the factors upon which a firm’s strategic plan are based
change and these changes are not reflected in that firm’s strategic
plan, that firm may end up sticking with a strategic plan that is no
longer optimal for generating value.131 In fact, business
commentators widely identify continued adherence to the same
stale strategy as one of the greatest management pitfalls.132 That, in
turn, can undermine a firm’s ability to compete and, in turn, to
generate value.
GM’s strategic-planning process failures mentioned above
likely explain why it ended up sticking with a stale strategy for so
many years. For example, its assumption that foreign competitors
were only temporarily in the U.S. market in the 1980s133 might
explain why GM’s strategic plan repeatedly failed to call for the
manufacture of smaller, more fuel-efficient vehicles despite
repeated surges in demand for those vehicles.134 Such an erroneous
assumption about its competition might also explain why GM
failed for some time to modernize its production processes to
increase its operational efficiency.135 As a result of these strategic
130. See BEASLEY ET AL., supra note 88, at 9.
131. See DAVID, supra note 11, at 8, 286–95; THOMPSON, JR., ET AL., supra
note 26, at 11–12, 43.
132. See, e.g., DAVID, supra note 11, at 288.
133. See supra note 98 and accompanying discussion.
134. See Thomas H. Klier, From Tail Fins to Hybrids: How Detroit Lost Its
Dominance of the U.S. Auto Market, 33 ECON. PERSP. 2, 5–7 (2009) (noting that
the U.S. car companies only introduced small cars in 1957 long enough to stem
the tide of foreign imports and thereafter resumed manufacturing larger cars and
that when they reintroduced small cars in the mid-60s to respond to the
resurgence of foreign imports, they were of inferior quality to foreign imports).
For a discussion of the factors giving rise to demand for smaller, more fuelefficient cars, see HARBOUR, supra note 98, at 136–37; INGRASSIA & WHITE,
supra note 98, at 13; Klier, supra, at 2, 5–7.
135. See HARBOUR, supra note 98, at 70, 77–78, 117–25. GM’s
organizational structure also contributed to its operational inefficiency, and may
have in fact undermined its strategy-planning process. See Detroitosaurus
Wrecks, ECONOMIST, June 4, 2009, at 9, 9. GM tried to address its structural
problems with a number of restructurings. The Decline and Fall of General
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missteps, GM lost market share over the course of three decades136
and ultimately had to file for bankruptcy. Thus, GM demonstrates
how a company can fail, or at least place itself in a precarious
position, not because of excessive risk taking, but because of the
systematic failure to critically assess its competitive landscape
when creating its strategic plan.
4. Board’s Role in Strategic Management
The board plays a critical role in the strategic-management
process. Specifically, boards supervise officers in managing that
process.137 This role flows from the board’s function as the
supervisory body over all corporate activities.138

Motors, ECONOMIST, Oct. 10, 1998, at 63, 63. However, most were ineffectual.
See id. According to car industry expert James Harbour, GM began to improve
its structure in 1994. HARBOUR, supra note 98, at 79–80.
136. See GM VIABILITY SUMMARY, supra note 4, at 3; see also Bill Vlasic &
Andrew Ross Sorkin, G.M. and Chrysler Explore Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11,
2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/11/business/11auto
.html (stating that GM and Ford once “dominated the auto industry—until
Japanese and other foreign car makers began making inroads into the American
market” and that while “G.M. once commanded about 50 percent of the
American vehicle market . . . its share so far this year [referring to 2008] has
fallen to 22 percent”).
137. CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO ET AL., THE CONFERENCE BD., INC., THE
ROLE OF U.S. CORPORATE BOARDS IN ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 6
(2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=941179
(“The full board clearly has oversight responsibility for strategy as well as
ERM.”); DAVID LARCKER & BRIAN TAYAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
MATTERS: A CLOSER LOOK AT ORGANIZATIONAL CHOICES AND THEIR
CONSEQUENCES 169 (2011) (stating that it is management’s––not the board’s––
job to develop strategy and that the board’s role is to scrutinize strategy to make
sure that it is appropriate for stakeholders and then to monitor the contribution
of corporate activities to the strategy); FRIGO & ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 1
(“It is the board’s responsibility to ensure that management is devoting the right
attention and resources to ERM and is setting the right tone for ERM.”). See
also DAVID, supra note 11, at 200 (recommending that a board conduct an
annual review of strategy much in the same fashion that it supervises an annual
financial audit).
138. See Olson Bros., Inc. v. Englehart, 211 A.2d 610, 615 (Del. Ch.
1965), aff’d, 245 A.2d 166 (Del. 1968); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
141(a) (Westlaw 2012) (“The business and affairs of every corporation
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors . . . .”). Officers, rather than directors, formulate strategy
because they are generally more knowledgeable about firm resources,
competitors, markets, customer demand, types of risks that are likely to
occur and their likely impact, among other factors, given their day-to-day
involvement in firm affairs. See In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877
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Recently, commentators and policymakers have been
clamoring for more board oversight over the management of
risk.139 This undoubtedly flows from the financial crisis, which is
widely believed to have been caused by inadequate riskmanagement oversight.140 While oversight over the management of
risk is consistent with the board’s role in overseeing processes
through which firms create value, such oversight only focuses on
one aspect of that role. However, it ignores the board’s role in
overseeing processes to create value through strategic
management.
Importantly, the board often also serves an advisory role in the
formulation and revision of strategic plans for the creation of
gains.141 In that capacity, the board provides advice and
suggestions to officers as to which strategic plan to select. It is
perhaps because of this role that some commentators depict the
board as an active participant in the formulation of strategy.142
Still, even where the board provides strategic advice, as a practical
matter, and given their informational advantage, officers and their

A.2d 975, 1003 (Del. Ch. 2005) (noting that CEOs, CFOs, and other officers
are well-positioned to act impartially and are better positioned than outside
directors to act expertly “[w]hen it comes to determining what products to make
or what suppliers to use . . . .”).
139. See infra Part IV.
140. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
141. See Jeffrey L. Coles et al., Boards: Does One Size Fit All?, 5–6 (2005),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=665746 (noting that outside directors serve
to advise the CEO on business strategy); Lynne L. Dallas, The Multiple Roles of
the Board, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 781, 807 (2003) [hereinafter Dallas, Multiple
Roles]. Boards also make some strategic decisions. Those strategic decisions,
which require board approval under statute, include dissolutions as well as
fundamental transactions such as mergers. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251,
252 (Westlaw 2012) (requiring board approval for mergers); id. § 271 (requiring
board approval for sale of all or substantially all assets); id. § 275 (requiring
board approval for dissolutions). The decision to dissolve, or to pursue a
fundamental transaction, is a quintessential strategic decision, for that decision
dictates whether that enterprise will exist in the future and, if so, in what form.
Because this Article is about the strategic management of firms in an ongoing
business, it does not address the board’s role in these other contexts.
142. See, e.g., Dallas, Multiple Roles, supra note 141, at 808 (stating that
survey respondents indicated that it is the board’s responsibility to become
involved in both the setting and review of corporate strategy); Pan, Rethinking
the Board’s Duty, supra note 21, at 217–21 (describing the board’s duties to
monitor the performance of officers and to manage strategy by dictating
corporate strategy).
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subordinate managers, rather than directors, ultimately decide
which wealth-creating strategy to pursue.143
Boards also influence strategy through their selection of the
CEO.144 That is because the CEO, given her position, is the top
corporate strategist. By selecting a candidate who stands for a
particular corporate strategy, the board effectively indicates which
candidate’s corporate strategy it endorses.145 That is also true
where a board creates a CEO succession plan; by deciding who is
to take over upon the CEO’s departure, the board indicates which
potential successor’s corporate strategy it agrees with.146 Thus, the
board influences the strategic-management process through its
selection of the CEO and her successor.
B. Advantages (and Disadvantages) of Strategic Management
It is clear that firms derive substantial value from managing
their risks, for that process better ensures that firms realize value
from their planned-for growth strategies by minimizing the adverse
impact from risk-creating losses. However, there are numerous
benefits that flow from deliberately managing a firm’s strategy for
the creation of gains even apart from managing its risks.
For one, strategic management allows an organization to
formulate better strategic plans for the creation of gains through a
more systematic, logical, and rational process.147 That, in turn,
causes a firm’s managers to be more deliberate and deliberative in
planning the firm’s future and, moreover, to exert more control
over that firm’s destiny.148
Strategic management also causes a firm’s managers to be
more cognizant of the firm’s source of competitive strength and
143. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the
Corporate Board of Directors, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 105 (2004) (“As a
practical matter, the outside directors must rely on information presented to
them by the corporation’s officers when making decisions. . . . Given these
constraints of time and information, the board can hardly initiate much of any
corporate strategy or decisions. Instead, the board’s role largely falls to approval
of such strategies and decisions as officers bring before the board.”).
144. See Dallas, Multiple Roles, supra note 141, at 789 (noting that boards
typically select and determine the compensation of the CEO and occasionally of
other top officers).
145. See Dirk Sliwka, Managerial Turnover and Strategic Change, 53
MGMT. SCI. 1675, 1675–76 (2007) (citing evidence that managers need to be
replaced to successfully implement shifts in strategy, as managers are often
reluctant to abandon the strategies that they have selected).
146. See id.
147. DAVID, supra note 11, at 16.
148. See id.
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weakness; resources, competitors, and other constraints; and
opportunities. That, in turn, allows the firm’s managers to more
appropriately reflect all of these inputs, as well as risk, when
determining firm objectives and strategy.
In addition, strategic management promotes coordinated
activity within a firm, for it causes a firm to identify specific goals
to be achieved, as well as a road-map for achieving those goals.
Thus, employees are better able to understand to what ends their
efforts are to be devoted and, as a result, do not pull the firm in all
different directions with their various uncoordinated and
undirected decisions and activities. Such coordination and
communication can further augment employees’ commitment to
the firm’s plan for the creation of value.149
Perhaps one of the most compelling reasons for managing a
firm’s strategy is that it combats managers’ incentive to manage
for the short term.150 Short-termism refers to the undue focus by
firms on short-term profits rather than the creation of true,
sustained value.151 As I argued in a prior article, short-termism
derives in part from the public disclosure of information that has a
short-term bent, leading investors to over-value such disclosed
short-term indicia and to under-value undisclosed drivers of longterm value, such as a firm’s strategic plan for the creation of
gains.152 Investor short-termism impacts the behavior of directors
through shareholders’ exercise of voting and other powers.153
Directors, being responsive to their electing shareholders, tie
executive compensation to short-term performance metrics rather
than the creation of true value.154 The end result is that firms
under-invest in research and development and in new incomeproducing assets, as the benefits from such investments are only
realized over time.155 This, in turn, retards firms’ creation of true
value.156
Strategic management combats short-termism because it is a
method of managing a firm to achieve predetermined, long-term

149. See id. at 17.
150. See id.
151. Grossman, Short-Term Fling, supra note 19, at 905–06.
152. Id. at 914–21. See also Natalie Mizik, The Theory and Practice of
Myopic Management, 47 J. MARKETING RES. 594, 594 (2010) (explaining how
managers face incentives and feel pressures that lead to an overemphasis on
short-term goals).
153. Grossman, Short-Term Fling, supra note 19, at 922–32.
154. Id. at 932–33.
155. Id. at 938–40. See also Mizik, supra note 152, at 595.
156. Mizik, supra note 152, at 608.
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objectives for the creation of true value.157 Thus, managers at
strategically managed firms are guided not by the next quarter’s
expected results but by the firm’s plan for how to deploy its
resources over time to achieve its wealth-creating objectives.158
Managing a firm’s strategy generates a number of indirect
benefits as well. One indirect benefit of strategic management is
that a firm’s objectives can serve as a framework for the
development of a CEO succession plan.159 Specifically, once
strategists have formulated firm objectives under board
supervision, the board can focus its succession planning efforts on
finding an individual to best achieve those objectives upon the
CEO’s departure.160 And by addressing this risk ex ante rather than
after the CEO departs, a firm can better ensure the continuity of its
existence and minimize the disruption that the transition to a new
CEO has on its operations.
Strategic management can also benefit executive compensation
efforts. Specifically, a firm that engages in strategic management
will have identified what its objectives are and will also have
designed a strategy to achieve those objectives. Firms that have
designed such objectives and strategies can then tie their
executives’ compensation to successfully achieving those
objectives and efficiently implementing those strategies.161 In fact,
numerous commentators promote tying executives’ bonuses to
such performance measures.162
While there are undoubtedly other benefits to managing a
firm’s strategy for the creation of gains, those mentioned above are
some of the more salient ones. And they likely explain why
numerous commentators have found that firms that use strategicmanagement concepts are more successful, and more profitable,

157. See supra Part II.A.
158. As one commentator has noted, “firms that perform poorly often engage
in activities that are shortsighted and do not reflect good forecasting of future
conditions.” DAVID, supra note 11, at 17.
159. MATTEO TONELLO ET AL., THE CONFERENCE BD., THE ROLE OF THE
BOARD IN TURBULENT TIMES . . . CEO SUCCESSION PLANNING 14 (2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1448021 (“The
board of directors should view succession planning as an integral part of longterm strategy. The process should be continuous, not reactive or ad hoc.”).
160. Id. at 14–15.
161. Admittedly, there are complexities in tying an executive’s compensation
to performance targets that may not be financial. Exploring how this can be
achieved, as well as the associated challenges, is beyond the scope of this
Article.
162. See, e.g., LARCKER & TAYAN, supra note 137, at 180–81; THOMPSON,
JR., ET AL., supra note 26, at 42.
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than those who do not.163 Still, I would be remiss if I did not
mention the disadvantages of strategic management.
Perhaps the most apparent disadvantage of strategic
management is that it requires the commitment of valuable time
and energy, often of key executives and directors.164 Some
managers must focus not on managing current operations, but on
planning for the future. Still, over time, these costs should be
outweighed by the benefits of having in place and implementing a
carefully designed plan to create value.
In addition, setting out on a predetermined path might give
managers a false sense of confidence in the selected strategic
direction, even causing them to put on blinders to new risks and
opportunities.165 Moreover, a firm’s strategic plan for the creation
of gains might become so embedded in its culture that managers
simply cannot envision an alternate path.166 Of course, an effective
planner might include, as part of the strategic-management
process, a mechanism to prevent such moral or cultural attachment
to any particular strategic plan. The board may also serve as a
check on this kind of over-attachment to strategy, viewing the
firm’s strategy for wealth creation from a more detached position.
Thus, it is not clear that this challenge undermines the virtues of
the strategic-management process.
Finally, a firm might not realize the benefits of strategic
management if it does not implement an effective and efficient
process. For example, as was discussed above, firms are often
ineffective at implementing their strategy.167 As a result, they are
not able to effectively harness the powers of their firm’s
competitive advantage, as provided in their strategic plan, to create
gains.168 Moreover, a firm’s strategic plan may not be updated
when changed circumstances necessitate the plan’s revision.169 The
result is the continued implementation of a stale strategy that may
undermine that firm’s ability to compete.170
This last challenge describes the risks attendant to the
mismanagement of strategy, rather than the management of
strategy. Thus, it is not necessarily a pitfall of the process, but
rather a pitfall of the process done poorly. Still, managers need to
163.
17.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See DAVID, supra note 11, at 17; THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 26, at
See DAVID, supra note 11, at 18–19.
See MINTZBERG ET AL., supra note 25, at 15.
See id. at 16.
See supra Part II.A.2.
See supra Part II.A.2.
See supra Part II.A.3.
See supra Part II.A.3.
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be wary of these pitfalls, which can undermine the benefits of the
strategic-management process, and should attempt to create a
process that controls for such pitfalls to the extent possible.
III. CORPORATE LAW STRATEGIC-MANAGEMENT DUTIES
As I explained in Part II, to manage a firm’s strategy is to
manage that firm in a way that is designed to maintain its
competitiveness so that it can continue to thrive, and create value,
in a changing environment. To be effective, a firm’s strategic plan
must not only create a road map for its operation in light of that
firm’s risks, but it must also reflect that firm’s competitive
advantage (and weaknesses), its resources and other constraints,
and its opportunities. In other words, while managing a firm’s risks
is critical to its creation of value, that process alone does not create
value––a firm creates value by also conducting the corollary
process of formulating and implementing a well thought-out
strategic plan for the creation of gains. Nevertheless, as this
discussion shows, legal duties focus only on the management of
risk to prevent losses and ignore the management of strategy for
the creation of gains.
This discussion begins, in Section A, by considering officers’
and directors’ duties under state corporate law to implement a
strategic-management process at their firm. Because this Article
focuses on strategic management in an ongoing business, that
discussion does not focus on officers’ or directors’ duties in the
takeover context. That is not to say that selling a business is not an
important strategic decision––it is one of the most important
strategic decisions that can be made with respect to a firm, for it
could lead to the firm’s disappearance or continuance in an entirely
different form. But this Article is focused on the context where a
firm formulates and implements a strategic plan for the creation of
gains through means other than such fundamental transactions.
Moreover, this discussion looks only at Delaware law because
most public companies are incorporated in Delaware.171 In
addition, Delaware law is often followed or looked to for guidance
in other jurisdictions.172
Section B then delves into federal securities laws. Federal
securities laws also regulate, to some extent, the duties of officers
and directors of public companies. They primarily do so through
171. Nadelle Grossman, Director Compliance with Elusive Fiduciary Duties
in a Climate of Corporate Governance Reform, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
393, 396−97 (2007).
172. Id. at 397.
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disclosure mandates, which indirectly impact conduct. Moreover,
stock exchanges promulgate rules, some of which relate to the
internal governance of listed companies. Section B considers those
laws and rules that most directly relate to officers’ and directors’
strategic-management roles.
A. State Law Mandates
Directors and officers have an overarching duty to act in good
faith and in a manner reasonably believed to be in the best interest
of the corporation.173 This overarching duty is the foundation upon
which fiduciary duties––the duty of loyalty and the duty of care––
exist.174
This overarching duty is generally understood to have both a
negative, as well as an affirmative, component. Namely, it has
been interpreted as imposing a duty both to refrain from acting
contrary to the interests of a corporation and to act affirmatively in
a way that furthers the corporate purpose.175 As the Delaware
Supreme Court held in the seminal case Guth v. Loft, Inc.,176 the
director’s duty is “not only affirmatively to protect the interests of
the corporation committed to his charge, but also to refrain from
doing anything that would work injury to the corporation, or to

173. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971). See
also Leo E. Strine, Jr., et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of
Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 643 n.31 (2010) (identifying
the Schnell case as the classic case standing for this proposition with respect to
directors); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (2009).
174. See Strine, Jr., et al., supra note 173, at 634.
175. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); see also
Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate
Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 39–40 (2003) [hereinafter Johnson, After Enron]
(demonstrating that loyalty contains a minimum dimension, which precludes a
director from personally benefitting from a transaction, as well as a maximum
dimension, which requires that a director be affirmatively devoted to the
corporate well-being); Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties Are There in
Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1262–63 (2010) (arguing that the
language in Guth, in which the Delaware Supreme Court indicated the
affirmative and negative aspects of fiduciary duties, was general principles
rather than part of the duty of loyalty); cf. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31 cmt.
1.A (2009) (quoting Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 n.2
(Del. Ch. 1996)) (noting that bad faith is presented where the board authorizes a
transaction for some purpose other than a genuine attempt to advance corporate
welfare or is known to violate applicable positive law).
176. 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
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deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and ability might
properly bring to it.”177
Still, this overarching duty does not set forth an enforceable
standard. Rather, it is enforced through the more specifically
formulated fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.178 The duty of care
applies to officers and directors, both when they are making
specific business decisions and when they are not.179 When officers
and directors are making specific decisions, the duty of care
demands that they become informed of all information reasonably
available.180 The fiduciary must then make the decision exercising
appropriate care.181 When they are not faced with a specific
business decision, the duty of care demands that officers and
directors pay attention to the firm committed to their charge.182
This latter aspect of the duty of care is often referred to as the duty
of oversight.
177. Id. at 510. Accord Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d
1261, 1280 (Del. 1988) (“Not only do these principles [referring to fiduciary
duties] demand that corporate fiduciaries absolutely refrain from any act which
breaches the trust reposed in them, but also to affirmatively protect and defend
those interests entrusted to them.”); see also Johnson, After Enron, supra note
175, at 58, 71 (“Corporate law discourse contains both the minimal and maximal
strands of loyalty, though the former is considerably more developed. . . .
[A]ffirmative loyalty to corporate interests also is a legal duty, notwithstanding
much judicial emphasis on the minimal need only to refrain from disloyal
conduct.”); Strine, Jr., et al., supra note 173, at 635–36 (citing Johnson, After
Enron, supra note 175, at 39–40) (“The Hippocratic maxim to first do no harm
is of course relevant to a corporate fiduciary’s role, but, like the role of a
physician, the director's job demands affirmative action––to protect and to better
the position of the corporation.”).
178. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370
(Del. 2006) (holding that only the duties of care and loyalty, where violated,
may result in liability, and that the duty to act in good faith does not establish an
independent fiduciary duty).
179. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch.
1996). See also Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708−09 (2009) (explicitly
holding that officers owe the same fiduciary duties as directors). But see Stone,
911 A.2d at 370 (characterizing the duty of loyalty as encompassing the duty of
oversight).
180. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985), overruled on
other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009); Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000).
181. Smith, 488 A.2d at 872–73; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. Despite the duty
to exercise appropriate care in making decisions, courts tend to focus only on the
duty to become informed under the duty of care. See, e.g., Brehm, 746 A.2d at
259.
182. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
141(a) (Westlaw 2012).
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Strategic-management processes would seem to fall under the
purview of the duty of oversight. That is because the question
whether officers or directors must ensure that their firm has a
strategic-management system in place is not a question of whether
officers or directors became informed in connection with a specific
strategic decision, but rather a question of whether they otherwise
paid adequate attention to the firm’s strategic-management
processes. Thus, the rest of this discussion focuses on the duty of
oversight. First, subsection 1 looks at the legal duty itself. Then,
subsection 2 applies that duty to the context of managing a firm’s
strategy for wealth creation.
1. Duty of Oversight
The seminal case regarding the duty of oversight is In re
Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation,183 decided by
the Delaware Chancery Court in 1996. In that case, shareholders
sought reimbursement from directors of $250 million that
Caremark had paid in fines to federal regulators and to settle suits
against it involving its violation of Anti-Referral Payment Laws.184
Caremark and the defendant directors ultimately settled the
derivative suit; however, under Delaware law, they were required
to obtain the Chancery Court’s approval of the terms of
settlement.185
In his approval of the terms of settlement, former Chancellor
Allen noted that the plaintiff’s case called into question the board’s
duty of care, not in the context of making a business decision, but
rather in the context of unconsidered inaction in the face of
employee misconduct.186 A board has a duty in this latter context
because, as the former Chancellor noted, business decisions of
officers and employees deep in the interior of an organization can
vitally affect the welfare of that organization and its ability to
achieve its strategic and financial goals.187 Thus, former
Chancellor Allen devoted the majority of his opinion to
determining what duty a board has to assure itself that its
corporation functions within the law to achieve its purpose so as to
prevent a loss.188

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

698 A.2d 959.
Id. at 961–62.
Id. at 960.
Id. at 971.
Id. at 968.
Id. at 967–69.
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a. Standard of Conduct
According to the former Chancellor, a board has a duty to
ensure that
information and reporting systems exist in the organization
that are reasonably designed to provide to senior
management and to the board itself timely, accurate
information sufficient to allow management and the board,
each within its scope, to reach informed judgments
concerning both the corporation’s compliance with law and
its business performance.189
This replaced the standard from Graham v. Allis-Chalmers, where
the court imposed no specific duty on directors to “root out
misconduct.”190
The Delaware courts have interpreted this standard in
Caremark as a standard of conduct.191 This standard is intended to
guide directors as to what is expected of them in supervising a
firm, even though it does not necessarily articulate a standard for
liability.192
Neither the court in Caremark nor subsequent Delaware court
decisions addressing the duty of oversight have clearly explained
what business performance means under this normative standard.
The absence of clarifying jurisprudence likely stems from the fact
that the typical Caremark case involves a challenge to oversight
over legal compliance systems or employee misconduct.193 In
those types of cases, there is no need to explain what business
performance means because the cases rest on those other aspects of
the duty of oversight. In fact, according to former Chancellor
Allen, his motivation behind the Caremark standard of conduct

189. Id. at 970 (emphasis added).
190. Id. at 970.
191. See, e.g., Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d
362, 368–69 (Del. 2006).
192. See id. For a discussion of the expressive function of the law, see infra
Part IV.B.
193. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 123
(Del. Ch. 2009) (noting that the plaintiffs’ allegations were a “twist” on a typical
Caremark claim, in which a plaintiff alleges that damages arose from a failure to
properly monitor or to oversee employee misconduct or violations of law);
Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 968 (“Although post-Caremark opinions and
commentary have focused on law compliance programs, the original Caremark
decision contemplated a similar duty with respect to the corporation’s ‘business
performance.’”).
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was to “change directors’ behavior through its simple statement
that directors have a duty to oversee legal compliance.”194
More recently, plaintiff shareholders have alleged deficiencies
in information and reporting systems relating to risks other than the
risk of a violation of law. In one of the most significant such cases,
In re Citigroup Shareholder Derivative Litigation, shareholder
plaintiffs alleged that Citigroup suffered massive losses from its
overexposure to risk in the subprime mortgage market.195
According to the plaintiffs, those losses stemmed from Citigroup’s
officers’ and board’s failure to assure that adequate and proper
corporate information and reporting systems existed that would
enable managers and the board to be fully informed regarding
Citigroup’s risk related to the subprime mortgage market.196 In
other words, the plaintiffs alleged a failure to oversee the
implementation of an information and reporting system designed
not to convey information about the risk of a violation of law, but
rather credit risk.
In Citigroup, the Delaware Chancery Court dismissed the
plaintiffs’ complaint, characterizing the plaintiffs’ challenge as one
which sought to hold “director defendants . . . personally liable to
the Company because [in hindsight] they failed to fully recognize
the risk posed by subprime securities.”197 While the court’s holding
is discussed in further detail below, in connection with a discussion
of the standard of liability, the important point to note here is that
the Citigroup court’s analysis focused only on a duty to oversee
information and reporting systems relating to risk––or as then-

194. Jennifer Arlen, The Story of Allis-Chalmers, Caremark, and Stone:
Directors’ Evolving Duty to Monitor, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 323, 341–42
(2009). See also E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What
Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992–2004? A
Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1436
(2005) (“[T]here is an evolving expectation in the standard of conduct [from
Caremark] that boards will set up and implement effective law compliance
programs.”). While this quote by former Chancellor Allen suggests that his
primary purpose for the duty of oversight was to encourage more board
oversight over legal compliance, I do not see that as undercutting its application
to officers as well, especially given the bases Chancellor Allen gave in
Caremark for the duty of oversight. See infra notes 206–17 and accompanying
text for an analysis of how the duty of oversight ought to, and likely does, apply
to officers.
195. 964 A.2d at 112. Shareholder plaintiffs also alleged that Citigroup’s
managers committed a waste of corporate assets in connection with various
mortgage-related investments, among other transactions. Id. at 115.
196. Id. at 123–24.
197. Id. at 124.
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Chancellor Chandler called it, business risk.198 Thus, the court in
Citigroup did not dictate any expectation on officers or directors in
overseeing a corporation apart from the installation and
implementation of systems to track risk.199
b. Standard of Liability
In terms of the standard of liability, Delaware courts have
conceded that it is very difficult to establish oversight liability.200
This reflects courts’ reluctance to second-guess managers’
activities, even in the context of unconsidered inaction. Thus,
under the standard of oversight liability, most recently expressed
by the Delaware Supreme Court in Stone v. Ritter, directors are
only liable for breaching their duty of oversight where they “(a) . . .
utterly failed to implement any reporting or information systems or
controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or controls,
consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus
disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems

198. Business literature is not clear on exactly what the term business risk
means. In fact, some business commentators describe business risk similar to
strategic risk; thus, it excludes credit risk, market risk, and operational risk. See,
e.g., CROUHY ET AL, supra note 63, at 25, 32–33. However, this interpretation of
the term business risk would mean that the very risk at issue in Citigroup would
be excluded from the kinds of risks that former Chancellor Chandler wanted to
exclude from judicial second-guessing.
199. The fact that the plaintiffs failed to make adequately particularized
allegations against the Citigroup directors or officers might have precluded the
need to conduct any detailed analysis of the duty of oversight. See In re
Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 127–28. But see Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 980
(“Chancellor Allen thus obviously intended the Caremark duty to extend beyond
mere law compliance to include such issues as business risk management.”);
Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate
Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 754
(2005) (“Although Caremark focused on the board’s duty to root out illegal
behavior, the case’s rationale extends comfortably to the exercise of business
judgment.”). Professor Lyman Johnson has questioned the efficacy of a
normative standard to oversee legal compliance programs due to its lack of
communication to the audience whom it was meant to influence––directors.
Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Counter-Narrative in Corporate Law: Saints and Sinners,
Apostles and Epistles, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 847, 871–73 (2009).
200. See, e.g., Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d
362, 364 (Del. 2006); Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 505–06 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(noting that Caremark claims are difficult to prove); In re Citigroup Inc., 964
A.2d at 125; In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967
(“The theory here advanced is possibly the most difficult theory in corporation
law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”).
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requiring their attention.”201 According to the court in that case,
either of these failures reflects directors’ bad faith and thus
amounts to a breach of the duty of loyalty.202
The Citigroup decision, introduced above, reveals the
Delaware courts’ reluctance to impose liability on directors for
losses caused by lapses in oversight over “business risk,” over
which a firm does not have control. According to the court in that
case, holding directors liable for such lapses would undermine the
well-settled policy in Delaware of avoiding hindsight evaluation.203
This policy exists because it is almost impossible for a court to
determine whether the directors of a company properly evaluated
risk in making an investment decision, and doing so could cripple
decision makers’ ability to earn returns by taking business risks.204
Thus, the court in Citigroup was unwilling to hold directors
responsible for oversight lapses absent misconduct or
wrongdoing.205
201. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (second emphasis added). The Delaware
Supreme Court purported to affirm the Caremark formulation of the duty of
oversight in Stone. Id. at 369. However, Professor Stephen Bainbridge has
argued that the court, in reality, was affirming the duty as modified in Guttman
v. Huang. See Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 975–76 (arguing that Stone raised
the standard of liability from Caremark, as Chancellor Allen in Caremark had
not premised oversight liability on directors being conscious of their torpor); see
also Guttman, 823 A.2d at 596 (“Although the Caremark decision is rightly seen
as a prod toward the greater exercise of care by directors in monitoring their
corporations’ compliance with legal standards, by its plain and intentional terms,
the opinion articulates a standard for liability for failures of oversight that
requires a showing that the directors breached their duty of loyalty by failing to
attend to their duties in good faith.”).
202. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. A director may not be exculpated for such
liability because she may not be exculpated if she is found to have acted in bad
faith. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii) (Westlaw 2012) (excluding bad
faith from the types of conduct for which directors can be exculpated).
203. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 126 (“To the extent the Court allows
shareholder plaintiffs to succeed on a theory that a director is liable for a failure
to monitor business risk, the Court risks undermining the well settled policy of
Delaware law by inviting Courts to perform a hindsight evaluation of the
reasonableness or prudence of directors’ business decisions.”).
204. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 126. See also Miller, supra note 18, at 98–
99 (arguing that it is absurd to think that a vice chancellor or chancellor on the
Delaware Chancery Court could possibly decide what kinds of riskmeasurement models a financial firm should use, how they should be
implemented, how they should be updated, how the proprietary data sets on
which such models are based should be collected, and what risk tolerances they
should use).
205. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 130–31. The court did not, however,
conclusively rule out liability for risk-management-oversight failures absent
misconduct. See id. Professor Larry Ribstein has questioned the clarity of the line
between inadequate controls of business risks, for which directors are generally
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c. Duty of Oversight of Officers
Despite the fact that the Delaware Supreme Court has
explicitly held that officers owe the same fiduciary duties as
directors,206 no Delaware case has ever applied the duty of
oversight to officers.207 Moreover, officers are thought of less as
overseers and more as doers––or those individuals who make dayto-day decisions under board supervision. Thus, it is questionable
whether and how the duty of oversight applies to officers.
Nevertheless, I believe that officers likely do––and ought to––
owe a duty of oversight similar to that of directors. That is because
the same three bases for imposing such a duty on directors also
apply to officers.
First, according to former Chancellor Allen in Caremark, the
duty of oversight derives in part from the seriousness with which
not liable (e.g., In re Citigroup), and inadequate controls of insider wrongdoing,
for which director may be liable (e.g., American International Group, Inc.,
Consolidated Derivative Litigation), arguing that this contributes to the
indeterminacy of corporate law. See Larry Ribstein, Another Perspective on
Citigroup and AIG, HARV. L. BLOG (March 8, 2009, 10:17 AM), http://
blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/03/08/another-perspective-on-citigroup-andaig/; Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Consol. Derivative Litig., 965 A.2d 763, 799 (Del. Ch.
2009) (finding that plaintiffs had alleged particularized facts showing that the
directors failed to exercise oversight over fraudulent and criminal conduct).
206. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
207. In a recent case, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware,
applying Florida law, held that officers owe a duty of oversight like directors.
See World Health Alternatives, Inc. v. McDonald, 385 B.R. 576, 591–92
(Bankr. D. Del. 2008). While the court in that case was applying Florida law, it
looked to Delaware law in determining officers’ fiduciary duties because “[t]he
Florida courts have relied upon Delaware corporate law to establish their own
corporate doctrines.” Id. at 590 (quoting Connolly v. Agostino’s Ristorante, Inc.,
775 So. 2d 387, 388 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)). Language in Caremark also
suggests that officers have a duty of oversight. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc.
Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“The case [referring to
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers] can be more narrowly interpreted as standing for the
proposition that, absent grounds to suspect deception, neither corporate boards
nor senior officers can be charged with wrongdoing simply for assuming the
integrity of employees and the honesty of their dealings on the company’s
behalf.” (emphasis added)). Moreover, Professor Martin Petrin has argued that
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Park, which holds that
“individuals who execute the corporate mission” have a duty to “implement
measures that will insure that violations [of law] will not occur,” appears to
impose a duty on officers and directors analogous to the duty of oversight.
Martin Petrin, The Curious Case of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability for
Supervision and Management: Exploring the Intersection of Corporate and Tort
Law, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1661, 1682 (2010) (quoting United States v. Park, 421
U.S. 658, 672 (1975)).
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corporate law views the board’s role.208 Officers also perform an
essential role in a business corporation’s operation. In fact, without
officers, there would be no one to make important day-to-day
operational decisions or to supervise the lower-level employees
who keep a firm running.
Secondly, according to former Chancellor Allen, the oversight
duty derives from the “elementary fact that relevant and timely
information is an essential predicate for satisfaction of the board's
supervisory and monitoring role under Section 141 of the
Delaware General Corporation Law.”209 If relevant and timely
information is an essential predicate for satisfaction of the board’s
supervisory and monitoring role, then officers, too, must have
responsibility for ensuring that systems are in place to deliver
relevant information to the board. In fact, the Delaware courts
already impose a duty on officers to disclose to their superiors
“material information relevant to the affairs of the agency
entrusted to them.”210 While this duty only requires officers to
inform their supervisors of information of which they are aware,211
it would seem to undermine the board’s ability to supervise
corporate affairs if directors only received information within
officers’ knowledge. The information and reporting system that
Caremark contemplates must not only be designed to bring
relevant and timely information to the board––It must also bring
relevant and timely information to managers, to allow them to
make informed judgments. Thus, it would seem that officers must
have a duty to establish an information and reporting system as a
necessary predicate to the officers’ and their subordinate

208. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
209. Id.
210. Hampshire Grp., Ltd. v. Kuttner, 2010 WL 2739995, at *13 (Del. Ch.
July 12, 2010) (citing Sci. Accessories Corp. v. Summagraphics Corp., 425 A.2d
957, 962 (Del. 1980)). See also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.42(b)(1) (2009)
(describing an officer’s duty to inform her superior officer or the board, to
whomever the officer reports, of material information about the corporation’s
affairs known to the officer and within the scope of her functions); A. Gilchrist
Sparks, III, & Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Common Law Duties of Non-Director
Corporate Officers, 48 BUS. LAW. 215, 226–29 (1992) (describing the officers’
duty to keep the board of directors informed); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 381 (1958). The Model Business Corporation Act imposes a similar
duty on directors, with respect to the sharing of information with codirectors.
See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(c) (2009). However, Delaware does not
impose an equivalent duty on directors.
211. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 cmt. a (1958) (“An
agent may have a duty to act upon, or to communicate to his principal or to
another agent, information which he has received . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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managers’ abilities to fulfill their own respective management
functions as well.
Finally, as former Chancellor Allen noted, the duty of
oversight derives from the need to install legal compliance systems
to receive reduced sanctions under the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines.212 This rationale would also justify imposing a
comparable duty of oversight on officers. In fact those guidelines
specifically contemplate that “[h]igh-level personnel of the
organization [will] ensure that the organization has an effective
compliance and ethics program, as described in this guideline.”213
While officers therefore likely have a duty of oversight similar
to that of directors, given the more limited scope of officers’
responsibilities, an officer should only be required to oversee
matters falling within her scope of authority.214 That is because it is
difficult to imagine an officer being charged with ensuring that a
comprehensive information and reporting system exists that is
designed to transmit information of which she is not aware and
would not need to know to discharge her function to officers to
whom she is not accountable.215
The same standard of liability applicable to directors would
likely also apply to officers. That is because it is equally difficult
for courts to assess in hindsight whether officers have effectively
overseen their subordinate managers.216 Nevertheless, given
212. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. These guidelines provide for reduced
sanctions for (i) the existence of an effective compliance and ethics program and
(ii) self-reporting, cooperation, or acceptance of responsibility. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8, introductory cmt. (2010), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2010_guidelines/Manual_PDF/Chapter_8.pdf.
213. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2)(B) (2010),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2010guidelines/ManualPDF/Chapter8
.pdf. The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines also provide that “[s]pecific
individual(s) within high-level personnel shall be assigned overall responsibility
for the compliance and ethics program.” Id.
214. For commentary suggesting that the scope of the duty of oversight
might vary for officers as compared to directors, see Paul E. McGreal,
Corporate Compliance Survey, 65 BUS. LAW. 193, 214 (2009) (arguing that
“officers charged with day-to-day operations may owe a more precisely defined
Caremark duty”).
215. This is consistent with guidance from COSO on the roles and
responsibilities within an organization for internal controls: “[I]n a cascading
responsibility, a manager is effectively a chief executive of his or her sphere of
responsibility.” See COSO, INTERNAL CONTROL—INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 4
(2002), available at http://www.coso.org/IC-IntegratedFramework-summary
.htm.
216. In fact, the court in Citigroup was faced with oversight claims against
officers, as well as directors, yet it did not distinguish officers in its oversight
analysis, suggesting that perhaps the same standards applied to both. See
Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Second Amended Derivative Complaint at 7, 38–41, In
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officers’ more engaged involvement in corporate affairs, it is
probably easier to prove that officers knew or should have known
of a control system deficiency that failed to bring to their or the
board’s attention relevant information than it is to prove such
deficiency by directors.217
2. Duty of Oversight Applied to Strategic Management
As Part II explained, directors oversee the formulation,
implementation, monitoring, and revision of a firm’s strategic plan
for the creation of value. Even where directors provide strategic
advice to officers, they are also exercising oversight, for effective
oversight means the ability to direct the person being overseen to
modify her performance if she is not performing effectively.218
While the board’s provision of strategic advice does not
necessarily indicate that officers are not performing their strategic
tasks effectively, it is consistent with the dialogical role between
the overseer and the overseen. Thus, oversight duties apply to
boards acting in their advisory role.
Officers, too, supervise a firm’s strategic-management
processes. That is because even though they are at the top of the
management chain, they do not manage wealth-creating strategy
alone. In fact, as I explained in Part II, given the predominance of
the bottom-up structure of strategic management, lower level
managers also make business decisions about strategy. Moreover,
all employees throughout an enterprise are responsible for
implementing strategy and for communicating changes in the
factors underlying a firm’s strategic plan to strategic planners.
Officers oversee these strategic-management efforts by their
subordinates to ensure that employees are properly discharging
these functions. For these reasons, and the reasons mentioned
under the preceding Section, officers should––and likely do––also
have a duty of oversight.
As mentioned above, the duty of oversight generally requires
that officers and directors pay attention to their firm to ensure that
it functions within the law to achieve its purpose. Thus, the duty, at
re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (No.
3338-CC), 2008 WL 3910741; In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 121–31. However,
the court only analyzed the plaintiff’s oversight claims as to directors. Id.
217. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 cmt. a (1994).
218. See In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 131 (discussing how the board’s duty
of oversight allows directors to intervene and prevent frauds and other
wrongdoing that could expose the company to risk of loss).
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least in its broadest sense, would seem to require that officers and
directors ensure that a firm has a reasonable strategic-management
process in place, for that process is what leads a firm to actually
develop the purpose (i.e., objectives) to be achieved.219
Furthermore, requiring oversight over strategic-management
processes recognizes that employees deep within the interiors of a
firm vitally affect not only the content of that firm’s strategic plan,
but also its ability to achieve its objectives through its strategy.
However, such a duty does not seem to exist either as a normative
standard of conduct or a standard of liability.
a. Standard of Conduct
In terms of the standard of conduct for oversight, Caremark
and its progeny create an expectation on officers and directors to
implement systems designed to inform managers and the board
about risks so that they can each make informed judgments. This
expectation derives from the expectation that officers and directors
will act in a firm’s best interest, even where they are not making
specific business decisions. Therefore, the information transmitted
to decision makers through such an information and reporting
system helps them to become informed so that they can determine
whether certain risks might necessitate responsive action to prevent
losses in firm value.
However, no Delaware court has clearly articulated any sort of
expectation on officers or directors to oversee a system designed to
inform them, or other managers, about drivers of firm strategy
apart from risk to enable them to make appropriate judgments
about the future direction of a firm’s business performance.220 That
is true despite the fact that such a system, like an information and
reporting system relating to risk, would also increase a firm’s
value. It would do that through, for example, the reporting of
information about a firm’s competitive strength, or a new
opportunity for the creation of gains. Without such a clearly
expressed standard of conduct, there is no legal normative
guidance to officers or directors in favor of this kind of system.
219. See supra Part II.A.1.
220. For further support for the proposition that the oversight duty is unclear,
see Assaf Hamdani & Reinier Kraakman, Rewarding Outside Directors, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1677, 1686 n.42 (2007) (“The jurisprudence concerning
directors’ oversight duty is still in its infancy, and there are no clear standards
prescribing what type of monitoring directors have to undertake in order to
discharge these duties.”). While Professors Hamdani and Kraakman made this
observation before the Citigroup case was decided, it seems to remain true even
after that case was decided.
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Moreover, even if we assume that the duty of oversight
included a duty to implement an information and reporting system
relating to strategic information in addition to risk, such a standard
would be incomplete. That is because the aspirational standard
under Caremark appears to only call for the implementation of an
informational system.221 However, processes through which
strategy is formulated, implemented, and revised depend not
merely on the functioning of systems to gather and transmit
information but also on systems that control for conduct, such as
controls on the kinds of new opportunities that managers can
pursue in discharge of the firm’s strategy.222 This is especially true
in the strategy-implementation stage, when a firm’s primary
challenge is ensuring that employees at all levels are actually
carrying out the marching orders laid out in the firm’s strategy. It
is certainly foreseeable that employees will either fail to pursue the
course of action called for by a firm’s strategy or pursue an
opportunity not called for by that strategy, given the troubles that
so many firms have encountered when carrying out this stage of
strategic management. Yet, the expectation that officers and
directors only implement information controls in overseeing a
firm’s affairs would fail to capture these other types of conduct
controls.
b. Standard of Liability
While it is perhaps a bit clearer in mandate, obviously the
standard of liability under the duty of oversight is intended to be
more limited in scope. More specifically, liability under the duty of
oversight is premised only on the risk of a violation of law or
employee misconduct.223

221. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370
(Del. 2006) (noting that one of the conditions for director oversight liability
includes the failure by directors to implement any reporting or information
system or controls); In re Citigroup Inc., 964 A.2d at 131 (“Director oversight
duties are designed to ensure reasonable reporting and information systems exist
that would allow directors to know about and prevent wrongdoing that could
cause losses for the Company.”); In re Caremark Int’l. Inc. S’holder Derivative
Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
222. See supra Part II.A. This point would also seem to be relevant for risk
management systems, which also include conduct controls in addition to
informational controls.
223. The duty of oversight likely only enforces a duty to oversee these kinds
of risks because firms are thought to have control over them. Other kinds of risk,
such as credit risk and market risk, are largely out of a firm’s control.

2013]

DUTY TO THINK STRATEGICALLY

493

Moreover, liability is premised on the need to prove losses.224
This means that even if the duty of oversight included information
and reporting systems relating to strategy, such lapses might not
give rise to liability, for strategic lapses often lead not to losses but
to foregone gains. So, for instance, if a firm failed to install an
information and reporting system relating to strategy, and, as a
result, officers misidentified the source of a firm’s competitive
advantage or were not aware of an additional opportunity, that
failure would lead not to a loss but rather to a foregone gain.225
Therefore, there would be no prospect of liability under the duty of
oversight.
The focus under the duty of oversight on preventing losses has
likely thrown judges off the scent of the need to promulgate a clear
expectation for directors and officers in overseeing their firms’
installation of wealth-creating processes. Specifically, because
cases presented before those jurists involve challenged oversight
lapses that led to losses, there is no need to address the demands of
a broader duty of oversight for the creation of gains. However, the
scope of a standard of conduct should not be limited by the context
of cases brought before the courts.
In sum, the duty of oversight only calls for oversight over
certain processes--the gathering and reporting of information–
pertaining to certain aspects of a firm’s operations—its risks. It
does not, however, clearly impose a duty on the board or officers,
even as a normative standard, to oversee the management of
strategy to create gains.
B. Securities Laws Affecting Strategic-Management Duties
Under a new SEC rule, public firms must disclose the extent of
their board’s risk-management oversight role.226 Thus, under this
224. It is likely that this element of a duty of oversight claim has led
academic commentators to focus only on risk of loss when considering what
directors must oversee under the duty of oversight. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra
note 18, at 968 (limiting the analysis of the contexts where Caremark claims
should lie to those cases where the corporation suffered losses); Pan, Rethinking
the Board’s Duty, supra note 21, at 210 (characterizing the duty of oversight as
a duty to “ensure that directors are attentive and vigilant against the occurrence
of harm to the corporation” (emphasis added)).
225. Injunctive relief also seems like an unlikely remedy because, as is
discussed above, courts are unwilling to second-guess managerial decisions as to
which processes to put in place to manage risk, much less strategy.
226. See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Exchange Act Release Nos. 339089, 34-61175, IC-29092 (Dec. 16, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/final/2009/33-9089.pdf (amending 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, 240, 249 and
274).
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rule, firms must disclose whether the managers who are
responsible for supervising risk-management report to the full
board, the audit committee, or a risk committee.227
This disclosure, while it does not impose a substantive
requirement on boards to engage in risk management, surely
suggests that boards must be doing something to oversee the
management of risk. It even implies that managers will report to
one of three possible board committees. This rule does not,
however, call for disclosure about how risk is managed apart from
the board oversight process. Thus, companies need not disclose
their other internal risk-management processes or policies.
Moreover, this rule does not call for the disclosure as to board
oversight over the management of strategy. Thus, similar to state
corporate law, the focus of the rule is on oversight over the process
through which firms limit losses and not on the process through
which firms create gains.
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has also attempted to
prod boards of listed companies into performing risk oversight.
Specifically, the NYSE’s corporate governance rules require the
audit committee of a listed corporation to have a charter that sets
out the audit committee’s duties and responsibilities with respect to
discussing risk-management policies.228 Even where the audit
committee is not the sole body responsible for overseeing the
management of risk, under these rules, it must discuss guidelines
and policies to govern the process by which risk management is
undertaken.229
This mandate, perhaps even more so than the SEC rule
discussed above, is designed to bring about more board
engagement in the risk-management process. It does so through
encouraging more communication within the audit committee
about risk-management processes. However, like the SEC rule, it
too ignores processes to bring about more effective management of
strategy apart from promoting better awareness on the audit
committee as to the board’s role in overseeing the management of
227. Id. at 40.
228. See NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.07(b)(iii)(D),
available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selected
node=chp1_43&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F (last visited
Feb. 21, 2012). The NASDAQ does not contain a similar requirement and does
not appear to contain any other special corporate governance rules regarding the
oversight of strategy or risk management. See NASDAQ, STOCK MARKET LISTING
RULES §§ 5600–5640, available at http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQ
Tools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp1_1_4_2&manual=/nasdaq/main/nas
daq-equityrules/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2012).
229. NASDAQ, supra note 228.
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risk. Thus, the NYSE mandate, like the SEC rule, seems designed
to prompt companies to enhance their processes to manage risk to
avoid losses, but not also to enhance their processes to manage
strategy to create gains.
C. Conclusion
As the preceding discussion reveals, corporate law does not
specify any clear standards for officers or directors, either as an
aspirational standard of conduct or standard of liability, to oversee
the implementation of processes to manage strategy to create gains.
Securities regulations and stock exchange rules also ignore the
management of strategy and primarily seek to cause boards to be
more involved in overseeing the management of risk. While these
legal standards are designed to encourage firms to improve the
processes through which they limit their losses from risks so that
they can create sustained value, these legal standards do not take a
similar approach to the corollary process through which firms
actually create value––that is, the management of strategy.
The next section explores why the law’s failure to mandate
oversight over the management of strategy apart from risk is
problematic and what should be done to address it.
IV. CREATING A STRATEGIC-MANAGEMENT NORM THROUGH
CORPORATE LAW
A. Making a Case for Change
As Part II showed, managing strategy is a multifaceted,
multilayered process, integrated with the management of risk, all
of which is designed to generate value.230 Despite that, judges,
policymakers, and commentators have focused their attention only
on the creation of value through better risk-management processes
and ignored the creation of value through strategic-management
processes.
Clearly, there are good reasons why state courts should be
reluctant to hold officers and directors accountable for the strategic
decisions that they make that turn out badly. Most notably,
business necessarily involves uncertainty that planners simply
cannot foresee, much less plan for, and to hold them accountable
for the adverse consequences of such uncertainty could cause them
230. See BRANCATO ET AL., supra note 137, at 5–6 (According to a survey
conducted by the Conference Board, directors acknowledged that “they must
oversee business risk as part of their strategy setting role.”).
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to be too cautious when selecting a strategy. But that does not
mean courts cannot or should not demand that officers and
directors put in place reasonable systems designed to inform them
and other managers of information relevant to the firm’s wealthcreating strategic processes and to implement controls designed to
ensure those strategies are effectively implemented. In fact,
Caremark illustrates that while the details of a system can be left to
the boards’ and officers’ discretion, the law can at least mandate
the adoption of a minimally effective system.
Nor is the fact that managers have incentives to create value an
adequate response to why courts should decline to set out standards
relating to strategic management for the creation of gains. While
officers would ideally be compensated for effectively managing
strategy to create gains, the reality is that it is hard to design a
compensation package that effectively does so given that some
objectives are qualitative and thus difficult to measure.231
Moreover, as Professor David Walker has argued, there is a lack of
understanding of which compensation instruments best link pay to
long-term performance.232 To the extent that financial incentives
alone cannot create a managerial drive toward achieving the
creation of gains through strategic management, the law should
pick up the slack, at a minimum, through an expressive standard of
conduct.
The SEC’s disclosure rules and the NYSE’s corporate
governance rules also focus solely on board oversight over the
management of risk, neglecting to address the board’s and officers’
role in overseeing the management of strategy for the creation of
gains.233 While the SEC’s and NYSE’s goal of protecting
investors234 might bespeak a need to have firms educate those
investors on risks that can lead to losses, surely investors are not
protected if the boards and officers of the firms in which they
invest do not also have a clear directive on their responsibility to
oversee the implementation of processes to create gains.
There is also a dearth of discussions in the academic literature
as to the management of strategy. In fact, in the past three years,
231. See supra Part II.A.3.
232. See David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus
of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. REV. 435, 450 (2010) (“We have little experience
with very long-term executive incentive pay arrangements and really no idea
which instruments would best link pay and performance over longer periods.”).
233. See supra Part III.B.
234. See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors,
Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Jan. 10,
2012).
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commentators have put forth numerous proposals for improved
risk-management processes.235 Yet, none of those commentators
discuss in any meaningful way how managing strategy relates to
the management of risk or the need to encourage or require firms
to more effectively manage the former in addition to the latter.
Admittedly, many of those commentators make a good case for
how improving the management of risk can enhance a firm’s
value.236 However, that argument alone does not drive firms to
more effectively manage their strategies to create value.
In one recent article, Professor Eric Pan provides some insight
into the strategic context for risk management.237 For instance,
according to Professor Pan, boards monitor officers by collecting
and evaluating information about officers’ performance and the
effectiveness of corporate strategy.238 Professor Pan also states that
boards offer advice concerning (or, if necessary, dictate) corporate
strategy.239 According to Professor Pan, these two roles are
inseparable, for a board cannot fulfill its monitoring role without
the ability to affect corporate strategy and respond to negative
developments.240 Likewise, a board cannot carry out its managerial
role without first collecting information about corporate operations
through its monitoring activities.241
Despite his discussion of the board’s strategic role, Professor
Pan’s proposal focuses only on expanding the scope of risks for
which the board’s duty of oversight applies.242 He focuses only on
risk because he believes that is the context in which there is the
greatest concern about officers’ ability to protect shareholders’
interests.243 However, as I have demonstrated in Part II, firms often
fail not merely because they do not adequately manage their risks
but because they fail to create strategic plans for the creation of
gains or fail to implement those plans. Thus, if we want to
encourage firms to create long-term value, we should not only
charge the board and officers with oversight over the management
of risk but also with oversight of the processes through which they
generate returns. Focusing legal standards only on the creation of
235. See supra note 21 and accompanying discussion.
236. See, e.g., Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 21, at 583, 592–94 (noting
that ERM is developing into a tool that can enhance firm value and proposing
that the SEC require qualitative disclosure about a firm’s approach to ERM).
237. Pan, Rethinking the Board’s Duty, supra note 21, at 218.
238. Id.
239. Id. Cf. discussion supra Part III.A.2.
240. Pan, Rethinking the Board’s Duty, supra note 21, at 218.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 225–27.
243. Id. at 225–26.

498

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

value by managing risks, and not the corollary process of
managing strategy, creates a number of risks.
First, such legal focus on risk-management practices could
drive managers to focus on, not surprisingly, limiting losses
through the management of risk at the expense of focusing on
managing strategies for growth. In fact, according to Professor
David Larcker, affiliated with the Corporate Governance Research
Program at the Stanford School of Business, a check-the-box
mentality associated with compliance is drowning out strategy.244
Even the NYSE, in a 2010 Report issued by its Commission on
Corporate Governance, cautioned that new governance mandates
and “best practice” recommendations over the last decade create a
risk that even the best boards will adopt a check-the-box mentality
rather than have corporate governance serve an integrated role in a
company’s strategy.245 One sign that firms may be ignoring the
management of strategy is the conclusion by numerous business
commentators that firms often fail to either monitor the
implementation of their strategies or fail to revise their strategies in
response to change.246
While the bulk of the concern that compliance is drowning out
strategy likely stems from the numerous SEC mandates on risk
management, surely the problem is compounded where corporate
law jurists and commentators focus narrowly on creating or
proposing new mandates as to risk management without giving any
clear sense for its strategic context or any imperative to perform
the latter as well. This would also seem to influence the SEC’s
view of the role and duties of the board and officers, for the SEC
looks to state law for such matters in crafting its disclosure rules.247
244. See David Larcker & Brian Tayan, Why Does Corporate Governance
Really Matter? New Book from Stanford Showcases Research into How Boards
Can Govern Better, CORP. GOVERNANCE & LEADERSHIP WIRE, STANFORD
UNIV. (May 19, 2011, 1:47 PM), http://www.stanford.edu/group/gsbcorpgov
/cgi-bin/blog/?p=1973 (quoting David Larcker as saying that “our [referring to
his and Brian Tayan’s] research shows that . . . [a] check-the-box approach is
not what we need from directors. We need instead their best thinking and ability
to manage risk appropriately for corporate growth”).
245. See REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 4 (2010), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs
/CCGReport.pdf.
246. See supra Part II.A.
247. See, e.g., Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act
Release Nos. 33-9136, 34-62764, IC-29384 (Aug. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2010/33-9136.pdf (amending 17 C.F.R. pts. 200,
232, 240, and 249) (“We are adopting changes to the federal proxy rules to
facilitate the effective exercise of shareholders’ traditional state law rights to
nominate and elect directors to company boards of directors. . . . The rule defers
entirely to state law as to whether shareholders have the right to nominate
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Thus, SEC regulations focusing on risk management may simply
reflect what the SEC views as the state law role of boards.
Second, legal standards specifying how firms should or must
manage risk to limit their losses might lead those firms to institute
a disjointed process whereby they manage risks in one way to suit
these legal requirements and manage their wealth-creating strategy
entirely separately, without regard to such constraints. Yet,
implementing such a disjointed process does not make sense given
the integral connection between risk and strategy, both of which
create value for a firm. In fact, implementing such a bifurcated
process might actually impair ERM efforts, which promote the
management of risk in a way that furthers the setting of firm
objectives.248
For example, one outgrowth of the post-financial crisis riskmanagement fury is the creation by some firms of separate risk
committees of the board.249 In fact, the Shareholder Bill of Rights
of 2009, which was a predecessor to the Dodd–Frank Act and
introduced by Senator Charles Schumer, would have required that
all public companies form risk committees of the board
“responsible for establishing and evaluating the firm’s riskmanagement practices.”250 While a risk committee generally
oversees the determination of a firm’s risk appetite and tolerance,

directors and what voting rights shareholders have in the election of directors.”);
Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8177 & 34-47235 (Jan. 23, 2003)
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8177.htm (amending 17 C.F.R.
pts. 228, 229, and 249) (“State law generally imposes a fiduciary duty upon
directors to protect the interests of a company’s shareholders. . . . Our new rule
[requiring disclosure of whether there is a financial expert on the audit
committee] provides that whether a person is, or is not, an audit committee
financial expert does not alter his or her duties, obligations or liabilities [under
state law].”); see also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977)
(“Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to
corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal law
expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to
stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.”
(alteration in original) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975))). The
SEC’s deferral to state law as to corporate internal affairs is also evident from
the fact that in 2008, the SEC submitted two certified questions to the Delaware
Supreme Court relating to the proper subject matter and scope of a Delaware
bylaw addressing the reimbursement of shareholder proxy expenses. See CA,
Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 230–31 (Del. 2008).
248. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
249. See BRANCATO ET AL., supra note 137, at 6.
250. See Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. § 5
(2009).
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as well as the processes the firm uses to manage its risk,251 it is
typically not responsible for general strategic oversight––that
remains a function of the full board.252
Though it may make sense for certain firms to have separate
risk committees, for other firms, such a committee would prevent
the full board from understanding the risks attendant to the firm’s
strategy.253 In fact, according to a survey conducted by the
Conference Board, many of the responding directors indicated that
they thought risk oversight should be a function of the full board
because it is so integrally linked to strategy oversight.254 By
stripping risk oversight from the full board’s domain, some boards
might be less effective at overseeing their firm’s management of
strategy to create gains.255
251. See Michael E. Murphy, Assuring Responsible Risk Management in
Banking: The Corporate Governance Dimension, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 121, 131–
32 (2011).
252. See supra Part II.A.4; see also discussion infra note 257 and
accompanying text.
253. LARCKER & TAYAN, supra note 137, at 195 (noting several reasons why
a company might form a risk committee but also noting that risk management
should not be an isolated function within a company and that any consideration
of risk should be made in conjunction with a comprehensive review of a
company’s strategy). The Dodd–Frank Act requires that certain large financial
institutions form separate risk committees, though the purpose is to prevent and
mitigate risks from the financial distress or failure of large, interconnected
financial institutions rather than from individual firm risks. Dodd–Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 165, 124
Stat. 1376, 1899–900 (2010).
254. BRANCATO ET AL., supra note 137, at 6. The Conference Board noted
how some firms embroiled in the financial crisis in fact had risk committees,
though their processes proved to be ineffective. MATTEO TONELLO, THE
CONFERENCE BD., THE ROLE OF THE BOARD IN TURBULENT TIMES . . .
OVERSEEING RISK MANAGEMENT AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 4 (2008),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1325028. The
Conference Board has also suggested that firms consider forming a risk
management executive committee led by the CFO or chief risk officer to allow
functional managers to voice at the executive and board level any concerns
expressed by lower level employees and to provide feedback on the
effectiveness of the ERM program. Id. At least one dedicated director with risk
oversight responsibilities would regularly attend meetings of that committee. Id.
255. See Veasey, supra note 68, at 14 (“The critical link between strategy
and risk points to the need for the full board––rather than any one committee––
to have responsibility for risk.”). Still, given the need for close collaboration
with officers, and for developed expertise, it may make sense for some firms to
establish dedicated risk committees. MATTEO TONELLO, THE CONFERENCE BD.,
EMERGING GOVERNANCE PRACTICES IN ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 33–34
(2007). The Conference Board has more recently suggested that firms consider
establishing risk management executive committees. See supra note 254 and
accompanying text.
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Additionally, short-termism may have derived in part from the
absence of reinforcing mandates as to the wealth-creating aspects
of strategic planning. Specifically, as discussed in Part II.B above,
short-termism is the undue focus by a firm on short-term revenues
rather than the long-term creation of value. A firm that does not
have realistic long-term objectives or a strategy in place to achieve
those objectives would not be able to provide its employees with
guidance in making decisions designed to achieve that strategic
plan. Without such a guide, they tend to make decisions with a
focus solely on producing short-term revenues.256 Thus, failing to
have an effective strategic plan in place contributes to the shorttermism problem that Professors Lynne Dallas, David Walker, I,
and others have identified and have put forth other proposals to
address.257
Even if we assume that managers currently manage their firms’
strategies effectively, there is no reason why the law should not
impose a duty on managers to do this. In fact, a normative standard
might be useful even to the most strategically minded managers,
who might be faced with situations and pressures that are
inconsistent with the objectives of long-term value creation.
Moreover, without a clear statement on what is expected of
officers and directors in terms of strategic management, those
norms might shift or erode over time.

256. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
257. See Lynne Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate
Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, passim (2012) [hereinafter Dallas, ShortTermism]; Grossman, Short-Term Fling, supra note 19, passim; Walker, supra
note 232, passim.
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B. Promoting Strategic Management Through Fiduciary Duties
State corporate law regulates the internal affairs of
corporations.258 That includes setting out the powers and duties of
shareholders, directors, and officers.259
State corporate law regulates through standards rather than
rules.260 There are several justifications for this approach. For one,
standards are much more flexible than rules.261 They are therefore
thought to be more appropriate in the corporate setting, where no
two corporations, corporate managers, or corporate contexts are
alike.262
Moreover, standards are typically generated and articulated
through stories told by courts.263 Thus, they have a narrative
quality that is not shared by rules.264 In the case of corporate law,
this is beneficial because, as Professor Edward Rock has argued,
one of the true benefits of corporate law is that it provides a set of
tales of good and bad managers that fills out the “normative job
description of these critical players.”265 Thus, it is not necessarily
the purpose of corporate law to sanction managers but rather to
provide a set of normative standards with which managers try to
258. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987); Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (“Corporations are creatures of state law, and
investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that . . .
state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.”).
259. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979) (“[T]he first place one must
look to determine the powers of corporate directors is in the relevant State’s
corporation law.”); Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Federalism in the
Administrative State: The SEC’s Discretion to Move the Line Between the State
and Federal Realms of Corporate Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1143,
1146 (2007) (“It is state law that creates corporations and decrees the rights of
the three key players in governance: shareholders, directors, and officers.”).
260. See William B. Chandler, III, & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism
of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two
Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 979 (2003).
261. Id. (“The Delaware approach has tended to create incentives for
particular good governance practices, yet also recognizes that what generally
works for most boards may not be the best method for some others. The
fiduciary duty form of accountability is well-suited to this sort of flexibility
because it is context-specific in application.”).
262. Id. at 956, 979; Roberta Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O.
Douglas—The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate
Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 81 (2005) (“The corporate governance
provisions of Sarbanes–Oxley are proscriptive in an area where flexibility has
long been valued.”).
263. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate
Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1013 (1997).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1016.
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comply because they believe doing a good job is the right thing to
do.266 That is especially important for directors, who often are
wealthy, well-reputed business people otherwise protected by
insurance. Thus, shame and reputational damage might be a more
effective disciplining mechanism than monetary damages.267
That is not to say that state corporate law serves only a
normative function. It also does, in some cases, provide a source of
monetary liability or injunctive relief. Yet, the primary function of
state corporate law, especially outside of the takeover context in
the absence of self-dealing, seems to be to set forth the normative
standards that directors and officers are expected to follow to be
responsible corporate citizens.
Given all of these attributes of state corporate law, I believe
that it is the appropriate medium through which to specify a
strategic oversight duty on officers and directors. In particular, its
flexibility is indispensable in setting out a standard for engaging in
a process that simply cannot (and should not) be standardized.
Moreover, its normative quality would allow courts to specify what
is expected of directors and officers in terms of processes to ensure
strategy is being effectively managed without requiring courts to
pass on the merits of any particular strategy. Importantly, it would
give managers a more complete normative picture of what is
expected of them in terms of managing the creation of value
beyond managing risk of loss.
To reflect the foregoing, I propose that Delaware courts clarify
that the duty of oversight demands that officers and directors
oversee the implementation of systems to inform them and other
strategic managers of information relevant to the management of
strategy in addition to risk. This clarification could come in the
form of a clarification of the term business performance under the
266. Id. See also LYNNE L. DALLAS, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: A
SOCIOECONOMIC APPROACH 211 (2005); Chandler, III, & Strine, Jr., supra note
260, at 956; Grossman, Short-Term Fling, supra note 19, at 962–63; Edward B.
Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the
Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1653–63 (2001); Cass R.
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2034–35
(1996). But see Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board:
Promoting Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105,
127–45 (2006) (arguing that social norms alone cannot adequately constrain
managerial conduct). According to Professor Rock, state courts provide an
important source of social control on officers and directors because they are
beyond the reach of the firm’s normal system of social control. Rock, supra note
263, at 1013.
267. See Sunstein, supra note 266, at 2032–33 (citing TIMUR KURAN,
PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE
FALSIFICATION 3 (1995)).
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duty of oversight. Thus, under the duty of oversight, officers and
directors would have a duty to design and implement information
and reporting systems to communicate information about
competitive advantage and weaknesses; resources, competitors,
and other constraints; and risks and opportunities to appropriate
strategic managers so that they can more effectively manage
strategy to create gains.
Clarifying that business performance includes the nonrisk
components of strategy would show that officers and directors
must oversee the implementation, not only of systems to prevent
losses, but also of systems to create gains, for all of those dictate a
firm’s business performance.
Moreover, Delaware courts should clearly indicate that the
duty of oversight applies not only to information and reporting
systems but to all systems designed to ensure effective
management of strategy. Again, this would reflect the fact that
managing strategy is not only about the reporting of information
but also about the installation of conduct controls designed to
ensure the strategy is actually implemented. Given the numerous
instances of corporate collapse due to ineffective strategy
implementation, it would seem that normative standards relating to
business oversight should encompass oversight of these critical
systems rather than just information.
These clarifications would take the form of normative
standards of conduct. In other words, I do not propose holding
officers or directors liable for failing to implement these standards.
That is because for the same reasons mentioned by former
Chancellor Chandler in Citigroup, it is difficult to envision how
courts could determine after-the-fact whether a firm’s failure to
achieve its objectives resulted from a flawed process or simply
unforeseen risk. However, my proposal would provide officers and
directors with a much-needed narrative of what is expected of them
in overseeing a firm’s ongoing operations apart from the present
ambiguous standard that seems to relate only to risk. This narrative
would, in Professor Rock’s parlance, fill out the “normative job
description” for these critical corporate players as to this critical
strategic function.
Hopefully the manifestation of a clear norm on engaging in
strategic management would encourage directors and officers to in
fact implement more effective processes for the creation of gains.
Thus, officers and directors could correct any strategicmanagement practices that fall below what is expected of them. It
also would demonstrate courts’ understanding of the context for
the management of risk, and the relationship between risk and
strategy, that currently seem to be lacking. Also, setting out a clear
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standard of conduct on the management of strategy would give
courts the appropriate vocabulary and concepts to explain why
business involves risk. And establishing such a clear norm could
serve as an additional force in the battle against the pressures to
create short-term value, for it would reinforce the need to create
and implement long-term strategic plans to guide employee
decisions, replacing the short-term earnings guidance on which
they would otherwise rely.268
In addition, shareholders could utilize this normative standard
to discipline errant officers and boards, perhaps by not voting in
favor of a board that fails to meet the pronounced expectation for
strategic management. They could also commence a derivative suit
against any officer or a board that failed to perform its expected
strategic-management role, arguing such conduct amounts to bad
faith.269 Although the duty of oversight would not presently appear
to capture such misconduct, the existence of a clear standard of
conduct could give rise to a perceived need for liability for failures
to conform to such expectation.
While pronouncing such a standard in the context of judgemade law requires the right case to come before the judiciary, I am
fairly confident that Delaware courts will have ample opportunity
to issue this kind of guidance in the aftermath of the financial crisis
in future cases involving challenges to “excessive” risk taking.
That is because strategic management is the corollary of risk
management, and thus a case that intends to capture the full spirit
of the duty of oversight would need to address not only what it
requires in terms of loss-preventing processes but also gaincreating processes. Delaware jurists could also put on their
commentator hats, as they often do, to give this kind of guidance
even before an appropriate case comes before the courts.
Finally, implementing this suggestion would require courts to
clarify that officers and directors are to primarily act in a firm’s
long-term best interest. That is because only if officers and
directors have a duty to look long term can they be expected to
implement and oversee processes by which long-term value is
created. Yet, as I argued in another article, corporate law currently
does not require that directors (or officers) take such a long-term
perspective.270 Mandating such a long-term focus would not only
drive officers and directors to focus on ensuring that their firms
268. For several other thoughtful proposals on how to combat short-termism,
see Dallas, Short-Termism, supra note 257, at 45–70.
269. See supra notes 200–01 and accompanying text (discussing the standard
of liability under the duty of oversight).
270. See Grossman, Short-Term Fling, supra note 19, at 950.
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have processes to guide their creation of long-term value but would
also serve as yet another force to combat the myriad pressures on
managers to manage for the short term.
This proposal would not only establish clearer standards as to
board and officer conduct in overseeing strategy but would also
provide cues to policymakers and courts of other jurisdictions as to
what officers and directors should be doing with respect to the
management of wealth-creation strategies. In fact, courts of other
jurisdictions often look to Delaware courts for guidance in
establishing their own fiduciary duty law.271 That may be
increasingly the case as courts in jurisdictions outside of Delaware
decide more and more cases under Delaware corporate law.272
Thus, those other forums may follow Delaware’s lead and be more
cognizant of the need for managers to not only manage risk but
also strategy, all to create value.
I do not anticipate that this proposal will transform businesses
into effective long-term managing machines. But, it is intended to
give business leaders the legal foundation, support, and urging that
they may need to focus their attention on the critical processes
through which their firms create value apart from limiting their
losses through the management of risk. Yet, I can already
anticipate a number of critiques to my proposal.
First, some critics might argue that Delaware law already
reflects these expectations on directors and officers. That is
because Delaware law already expects directors and officers to
implement “[a]spirational ideals of good corporate governance
practices” for they often benefit stockholders, sometimes reduce
litigation, and can usually help directors avoid liability.273
Moreover, it already obligates them to act in a manner that
affirmatively is in the corporation’s best interest.274 Together, these
could be interpreted to mean that officers and directors should
oversee strategic management, for that is good corporate
governance practice and the way firms create value.
My response to this argument is that such a standard is too
broad and generalized to be of much use to officers or directors.
Such a standard, for example, might simply mean that officers and
directors should not act in their own personal interest. Or it may
271. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
272. See John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 605 (2012) (finding that “the Delaware courts’ control of corporate
opinion writing ebbed away dramatically as the [first] decade [of the 21st
century] progressed”).
273. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 745 n.399 (Del.
Ch. 2005) (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000)).
274. See supra notes 175–77 and accompanying text.
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mean that they should ensure that risks that can lead to losses are
managed because those risks deprive a firm of value. In any event,
it should not be a mystery that officers and directors should
manage a firm to affirmatively create sustained value and that they
should do so not only through limiting losses through riskmanagement processes but also by creating gains through strategicmanagement processes.
This is especially true because the Delaware courts have hinted
at a normative standard in the oversight context of installing
information systems to inform directors and managers of business
performance. Yet, the ambiguity associated with the term business
performance fails to clearly signal to directors and officers what is
in fact expected of them, and courts’ discussions only of risk in
applying this principle compound this ambiguity.
In sum, given the relative dearth of judicial discussions
concerning strategic management apart from risk, it is hard to
determine a best practice for that process from existing fiduciary
duty law.
Second, some commentators might argue that state law does
not need to set a normative standard for the management of
strategy, for the free market ensures that they will manage in this
fashion if it truly creates value. According to this line of reasoning,
officers already have financial incentives––in the form of stock
options and other kinds of incentive compensation––to create value
and thus to implement processes to achieve that end. Shareholders,
too, want a firm to create value because shareholders are the
residual beneficiaries of such value.275 Thus, they, too, can be
expected to behave in a way that drives a firm to create value on its
own, without needing regulatory interference.
There are a number of flaws in this argument. First, current
compensation practices often motivate officers to generate value
over the short term.276 In fact, those compensation practices are
one of the primary drivers of managers’ excessive risk taking, for
their compensation is typically not reduced by losses that
materialize in the future, when risky future events unfold.
Similarly, those compensation practices do not motivate officers to
create true value through long-term strategic developments, again,
because that value is only realized over time.277 As such, incentive
275. See Grossman, Short-Term Fling, supra note 19, at 945–46 (explaining
the rationale behind the notion that shareholders are residual beneficiaries).
276. COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., BUILT TO LAST: FOCUSING CORPORATIONS ON
LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE 3 (2007). Shareholders tolerate this because they,
too, often want returns in the short term. Grossman, Short-Term Fling, supra
note 19, at 921–22.
277. COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 276, at 3.
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compensation does not always encourage strategic management of
a firm for the creation of true (rather than short-term) value.
Plus, there is some evidence that managing strategy might be
costly in the short term.278 Yet, true value is often only realized in
the future, when strategic initiatives have a chance to play out and
create gains for a firm. Given the tendency for firms to focus on
short-term results rather than long-term value, long-term strategic
management is undoubtedly compromised.
Moreover, this argument ignores the expressive function of
fiduciary duties, which is designed to encourage socially desirable
conduct. It is hard to imagine conduct that is more socially desirable
than the formulation and implementation of plans for the creation of
durable wealth. President Obama recognized this when he called on
the U.S. to resume its role as a leader in innovation to improve our
livelihoods.279 While innovation does not only take place in the U.S.
in for-profit corporations, most of it does. To be an effective
innovator, a business needs to create and implement a well thoughtout plan for the creation of gains. It cannot simply create durable
wealth through innovation by wisely managing its risks.
V. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have proposed that Delaware courts clarify
existing fiduciary duties to reflect the broader roles and
responsibilities of officers and directors in managing strategy.
Effectuating this change is important because it would more
completely reflect directors’ and officers’ true strategic functions,
rather than simply their risk-management functions. Importantly,
this change would also give the key corporate players a legal
infrastructure to support their engagement in the process designed
not merely to limit losses but also to create sustained value through
wealth-creating strategic management. That, in turn, could benefit
firms, their shareholders, other corporate constituents, and society.
278. See DAVID, supra note 11, at 18 (noting that some firms do not engage in
strategic management because it is too expensive in time and money and that other
firms view it as a waste of time because no marketable product is produced).
279. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by President in State of the
Union Address (Jan. 25, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse
.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address) (“The
first step in winning the future is encouraging American innovation. . . . What
we can do—what America does better than anyone else––is spark the creativity
and imagination of our people. We’re the nation that put cars in driveways and
computers in offices; the nation of Edison and the Wright brothers; of Google
and Facebook. In America, innovation doesn’t just change our lives. It is how
we make our living.”).

